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Frequent media reports of the loss or compromise of data stored on computer 
systems indicate that attempts to educate users on proper computer security policies and 
procedures seem to be ineffective. In an effort to provide a means of education that will 
more fully engage users, the CyberCIEGE game was created.  It is hoped that by playing 
CyberCIEGE users will absorb computer security concepts better than they have through 
more traditional forms of instruction, because many find games to be a compelling 
experience. 
 
Many users do not understand why good passwords and password management 
are important for information systems. This effort developed a scenario for CyberCIEGE 
to teach players about issues involved when developing a password policy for a computer 
system.  Limited testing showed the scenario accomplishes this. CyberCIEGE uses a 
Scenario Definition Language to provide developers and educators the ability to create 
scenarios that focus on particular concepts.  To streamline scenario development, a 
Scenario Definition Tool has been created. As a part of scenario development, this work 
also involved beta testing of the Scenario Definition Tool, a program that aids scenario 
developers in the creation of scenarios for the game.  This testing resulted in several 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 A. THESIS STATEMENT 
The purpose of this research was to develop a scenario for the CyberCIEGE game 
to train and educate users, system administrators, and computer security students in issues 
related to authentication and password policies.  A secondary goal of this research was to 
perform beta testing of the CyberCIEGE Scenario Definition Tool. 
B. THESIS SCOPE AND LAYOUT 
This thesis describes the development of a scenario for the CyberCIEGE game to 
educate users in issues related to authentication and password policies.  It also describes 
beta testing of the CyberCIEGE Scenario Definition Tool. 
The thesis chapters are laid out as follows: 
• Chapter I – Introduction and Background – This chapter introduces the 
project and provides a background discussion of the issues that motivate 
this thesis. 
• Chapter II – Development Methodology and Scenario Discussion – This 
chapter describes the scenario that was developed and the process by 
which it was developed. 
• Chapter III – Scenario Definition Tool Beta Test – This chapter discusses 
how the CyberCIEGE Scenario Definition Tool was tested and how the 
use of the tool affected the thesis.  It also provides a more systematic test 
plan based on the testing experience. 
• Chapter IV – Conclusion – This chapter provides a summary of the project 
and gives suggestions for related future work. 
C. PASSWORD POLICIES 
A computer system’s user authentication process, sometimes called the 
Identification and Authentication (I&A) process, supports a policy to protect the 
information stored on the system.  By allowing actions to be linked to the user that 
performs them, user authentication allows a system to provide such features as 
discretionary and mandatory access control, accountability, and auditing.  Because of the 
importance of a reliable system-level access control mechanism, this thesis focused on 
the impact of password policies on system-level access control. 
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A system-level access control mechanism restricts access to a computer system to 
authorized individuals by requiring the user to provide the computer with a shared 
secret—the password—that ideally is known only by the user and by the computer 
system.  Within the computer, a user is known by his or her user name.  The user name 
alone is not sufficient to prove identity, since user names on a computer system are often 
well known [Kurzban 1985].  For example, the user names on many computer systems 
are part of the user’s e-mail address, which is included in every e-mail message sent by 
the user, and is often made publicly available so that others can send the user a message.  
Since user names are well known, a computer system that required only a user name to 
gain access to the system would allow anyone who knew the user name to log in and pose 
as that user.  So a second piece of information is needed in addition to the user name in 
order to control access to a computer system.  Passwords allow users to prove their 
identities to the computer system. 
1. Three Possibilities 
User authentication schemes can be based either on secrecy or on unforgeability 
[Saltzer 1975].  Secrecy is based on a piece of information known only to the user and to 
the system.  Unforgeability is based on the user’s possession of something that is difficult 
to forge, and can be either a physical object or a unique physical characteristic of the 
user. 
Fingerprints and retina images are common examples of unique physical 
characteristics that can be used to authenticate a user.  While these can be attractive in 
that they are often hard to duplicate and cannot be easily lost, they are subject to 
variability (such as dirt on a finger) that forces a margin of error to be permitted, which 
can increase the rate of false positive matches.  In addition, the equipment required can 
be expensive and is not found on many computer systems. 
A second possibility is that a user can maintain possession of an unforgeable 
physical object, such that the system will authenticate anyone who can show possession 
of the object.  The attraction of this option is that, like the first, is that it does not require 
a user to memorize something.  However, the object can be subject to loss or theft, and 
thus is generally insufficient to be used on its own.  It may also preclude remote access to 
a computer system from an arbitrary location, since a physical device is usually needed to 
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interface the object and the computer.  Within a particular organization, this can be a 
viable option, since the organization can ensure that all workstations are equipped with 
the appropriate device. 
The final possibility is the use of a piece of secret information.  Ideally, this 
information is known only to the user and to the computer system.  A password is a 
common means of implementing this mechanism.  Since keyboards are standard 
equipment on computer systems, passwords can be easily entered and then transmitted 
over a network, permitting remote login from an arbitrary location.  Simple theft or loss 
cannot occur, however coercive or subversive means can still be used to obtain a user’s 
password.  In addition, because of the finite (and in Western languages, relatively small) 
set of characters used, it is possible that hostile users using a systematic attack can 
determine the password.  All of the possibilities are tried until one that works is found.  
This method is known as a brute force attack.  Such an attack can be carried out either by 
a direct brute force attack, where the attacker makes repeated attempts to log in to a 
system, or by a password cracking attack, where the attacker obtains a password’s 
encrypted form as stored on a system or transmitted over a network, then using a program 
on the attacker’s own system to attempt to determine the password by encrypting possible 
passwords until one is found that matches the target encrypted password [Bishop 1995].  
In order to decrease the effectiveness of a password attack, the organization responsible 
for maintaining a computer system must define an appropriate password policy.  
Password-based authentication systems also depend on the user to memorize the 
passwords.  If the password is forgotten, the user becomes unable to access the system.  
User mistakes when typing the password can also prevent access. 
It is also possible to combine these possibilities to create a multi-factor 
authentication system.  One common example of this system is the bank Automated 
Teller Machine, where the user must supply both a physical object, an ATM card, as well 
as a piece of information, a personal identification number, in order to perform a 
transaction.  Multi-factor authentication protects the card from malicious use in the event 
it is lost or stolen, since the malicious user does not know the personal identification 
number [O’Gorman 2003]. 
2. Elements of a Password Policy 
There are several elements of a password policy that affect the effectiveness of a 
hostile user’s brute force attack on passwords.  Among these are the password length, 
character complexity or alphabet size, and change frequency, as well as lockout or delay 
policies associated with the authentication process.  The number of possible passwords P 
for a given length L and alphabet size N is P = NL.  For a range of lengths from Lmin to 
Lmax, the number of possible passwords P is: 
P = N i
i=Lmin
Lmax∑  
One of the simplest methods of decreasing the effectiveness of a hostile user’s 
attempt to discover an authorized user’s password is by increasing the length of the 
password.  Each additional character in length exponentially increases the number of 
possibilities to be tried, as seen in Table 1 below, where each row represents a different 
password length.  
Another element of a password policy is the complexity of the character set or 
size of the alphabet allowed in a password.  If an English language computer system only 
allows upper-case letters, or does not distinguish between lower-case and upper-case, 
then the passwords would only be made up of 26 possible characters.  If the system does 
distinguish and permit both upper-case and lower-case, then the number of possibilities is 
raised to 52.  Allowing numbers and symbols raises the number of possibilities further.  
The number of possibilities that have to be tried for a given length is exponential; 
increasing the character complexity increases the base of the exponent, as shown in Table 




 Alphabet Size 
Length of Password 26 52 93 
4 4.57 x 105 7.31 x 106 7.48 x 107
6 3.09 x 108 1.98 x 1010 6.49 x 1011
7 8.03 x 109 1.02 x 1012 6.01 x 1013
8 2.09 x 1011 5.34 x 1013 5.60 x 1015
10 1.41 x 1014 1.44 x 1017 4.84 x 1019
Table 1. Number of possible passwords as a function of alphabet size and password 
length. From [Warren 2003] 
 
A further benefit can be realized by placing a lower limit on the character 
complexity of a password.  People have a tendency to use words in their language as a 
password, however a list of words for a given language already exists: a dictionary.  
Thus, rather than trying all possible combinations of characters, an attacker will often try 
working through a dictionary or list of words.  Adding requirements that users mix the 
case of their letters or use numbers or symbols in their passwords helps to reduce the 
probability that this simple dictionary-based attack is successful, since it reduces the 
probability that the password is in the dictionary. 
Allowing a range of password lengths increases the number of possibilities to be 
tried.  If an organization requires passwords of exactly seven characters, then the attacker 
will only need to try passwords with seven characters.  However if either seven or eight 
character passwords are allowed, then in addition to all of the seven character passwords, 
all of the eight character passwords will need to be tried. 
In the past, limitations of the algorithm that produced the “encrypted” password 
for safe storage limited the length of the password, but present algorithms have 
practically removed length restrictions.  However, human memory can limit the length of 
a password a user can remember, thus the concept of a pass-phrase came into being 
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[Kurzban 1985].  Rather than remember a sequence of characters, a user remembers a 
sequence of words.  This has the result of generating much longer passwords that are still 
possible to memorize. 
Requiring the user to change their password on a regular basis is intended to 
reduce the risk associated with an undetected compromise of a user’s password [NIST 
1985].  In the event a compromise is suspected, the password should be changed 
immediately.  Requiring that a password be changed even when no compromise is 
suspected restricts the amount of time that a password that has been unknowingly 
compromised can be used, and the longer the period of time that a password is in use 
increases the chances that someone other than the password’s owner learns it [Shinder 
2003].  While a password change policy does not impact the time it takes an attacker to 
determine a password using a brute force attack, the time it takes to complete one means 
that by the time the attacker has successfully determined the password, there is a high 
probability that it will have been changed and will no longer allow access to the targeted 
computer system. 
Related to the requirement that users change their passwords is the capability for a 
system to remember a user’s previous passwords in order to prevent them from reusing a 
password.  Users can also be required to keep a password for a minimum length of time.  
These two capabilities are often used together to prevent a user from changing his or her 
password, then immediately changing it back to what it was previously, effectively 
circumventing the requirement to change the password [Bickel 2003]. 
Perhaps the most effective method of preventing a direct brute force attack where 
the attacker is making repeated attempts to log in is a lockout policy.  A lockout policy 
causes an account to be locked out, preventing any logins, after a certain number of 
sequential unsuccessful login attempts.  In order to log in again, the user generally will 
have to contact a system administrator to have the account unlocked.  Alternatively, the 
system can be configured to unlock the account automatically after a certain period has 
passed.  With a lockout policy in place, a direct brute force attack becomes impractical, 
since after trying just a few passwords, any attempt to log in will fail. 
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While a lockout policy can be effective in preventing a direct brute force attack 
from being successful, it can also be used by the attacker to create a denial of service 
attack on the system, since locking out the account also prevents the legitimate user from 
being able to log in until the account is unlocked by a system administrator [O’Gorman 
2003].  Because of this problem, some organizations may find it preferable to 
automatically unlock the account, rather than requiring a system administrator to unlock 
it. 
An alternative to a lockout policy is a delay policy, where the system will wait a 
certain amount of time before allowing another login attempt after a failed login.  
Whereas a lockout policy disables the account that the user is attempting to log in to, a 
delay policy simply stalls the workstation for a few moments before another log in 
attempt can be made.  This severely reduces the speed at which an attacker can make 
login attempts, making this kind of direct brute force attack impractical, and has the 
additional benefit of preventing an attacker from being able to cause a denial of service to 
the legitimate user.  Table 2 shows how much time is added to a direct brute force attack 
of one million password possibilities when a system enforces various delay times 
between login attempts.  The times listed in the table do not include the time required for 
the system to determine whether or not a password is correct or the time it takes an 
attacker, whether manual or automated, to transmit the next password.  As the table 
shows, small increases in the delay time can have a significant impact on the time 
required to complete a direct brute force attack.  The relationship between the two times 
is linear. 
Delay Time (seconds) Time Added 
1 278 hours (11.6 days) 
5 1389 hours (57.9 days) 
10 2778 hours (115.7 days) 
30 8333 hours (347.2 days) 
Table 2. Time added to a direct brute force attack of one million password 
possibilities given various delay times. 
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One variant on a delay policy is to use increasing delays with each failed login 
attempt.  This method has the advantage of not causing a long delay if the legitimate user 
makes a mistake on their first attempts to login, while an attacker would encounter an 
increasing delay on each attempt. 
At first, it may seem that with a lockout policy, it is not necessary to place any 
restrictions on the password, since after just a couple of attempts the attacker would be 
unable to proceed further.  However, lockout policies are effective only for attacks where 
the attacker is attempting to log in to the system.  If the attacker can obtain the 
“encrypted” form of the password and perform a password cracking attack, additional 
factors such as password length and alphabet size are required to reduce the risk of a 
successful attack. 
3. Summary of the Elements of a Strong Password 
There is little agreement on what makes a strong password.  When creating a 
strong password, the goal is to create a password that is difficult for an attacker to guess.  
Typical rules for creating a strong password include using a password at least eight 
characters long, with both letters and numbers, and doesn’t include a dictionary word or 
other term that would be associated with the user, such as a name, birth date, or social 
security number [Sonnenberg 2003].  A system enforcing a strong password policy will 
often also include a lockout or delay mechanism. 
4. Password Generation Mechanisms 
Computer system passwords can be generated by either the computer or by the 
user. The terms machine-generated and user-generated are often used to describe which 
is used to generate a password.  Machine-generated passwords are generated by the 
computer system and assigned to the user.  User generated passwords are created by the 
user and entered into the system. 
Machine-generated random passwords are considered to be more secure since the 
algorithm that generates them can ensure the password meets the defined policy. 
However, they can be more difficult for the user to remember, thus user-generated 
passwords are often attractive [Bishop 1991].  One variation is to have the machine 
generate a random password using pronunciation rules, generating a random password 
that can be pronounced, rather than using a simple random character generator.  
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Pronounceable random passwords are generally assumed to be easier to memorize than 
truly random passwords [Ganesan 1994].  Another variation is for the machine to 
generate a list of random passwords, and allow the user to select a password from that 
list.  Often, user-generated passwords must conform to a policy that the computer can 
enforce, rejecting passwords that do not meet the policy. 
5. Identifying an Attack 
Reviewing system logs plays a major role in determining that a computer system 
is under attack [NIST 1995].  A system administrator can do this manually by visually 
reviewing the logs.  While this may be a viable approach for a very small organization, 
most organizations would find this to be a poor use of the administrator’s time, and 
would instead invest in an automated system that reviews the system logs and alerts the 
administrator when unusual activity is detected. 
For the case of a direct brute force password attack, a system log would show a 
series of failed remote login attempts.  For a password cracking attack, the system logs 
would not show any evidence that one is in progress.  However, they may contain 
evidence that an “encrypted” password has been compromised, such as attempts to access 
the file storing the “encrypted” passwords or user logins from unusual locations outside 
of normal business hours. 
6. User Resistance 
Many users dislike passwords, and especially dislike having the complicated 
passwords that are the foundation for a strong password, but can be hard to remember.  
The cost to an organization in lost productivity when users forget their passwords can be 
high.  Some estimate that 40% of IT help desk calls are password related, usually either 
because users have forgotten their passwords or have been locked out of their accounts 
[Bown 2004]. 
There are several reasons users tend to resist password policies.  Users often cite 
difficulties with password enforcement mechanisms as reasons for their resistance.  
Requirements to maintain different passwords for different systems and policies that 
require frequent password changes are often cited difficulties.  Adams and Sasse noted 
that users’ knowledge of what makes a secure password was inadequate.  As a result, 
users create their own rules for password design that, while the user may perceive them to 
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be secure, are not.  Computer security departments often operate on a security-through-
obscurity basis, on the assumption that the more that is known about a security 
mechanism, the more vulnerable it is to attack.  As a result they tell the users, whom they 
perceive as “inherently insecure”, as little as possible.  Users tend to be security-
conscious when they perceive the need for secure behavior, but, due to a lack of 
education and knowledge, often do not perceive such a need [Adams 1999]. 
As a result of this lack of knowledge, users often take actions that reduce the 
security of the organization’s computer systems.  Some write down their passwords.  
Others use similar passwords for different systems when differing requirements prevent 
reusing the same password. 
A major goal of this research was to provide a tool that can help users understand 
password policy issues.  It is hoped that with a better understanding, users will take their 
organization’s policy more seriously and make an effort to comply with both the letter 
and the spirit of the policy. 
D. MORE SOPHISTICATED ATTACKS 
The attack that is presented in the CyberCIEGE scenario developed as part of this 
research is a direct brute force attack.  Realistically, only an unsophisticated attacker 
would attempt this type of attack, which was selected for its simplicity and to prevent the 
player from being distracted by the complexities of more sophisticated attacks. 
A more sophisticated attacker would be more likely to attempt to gain access to 
the system by some other means, such as looking for an exploitable vulnerability in an 
application, and then attempting to locate the file with the “encrypted” passwords and 
copy it for offline cracking, or would attempt to obtain the password by capturing it as it 
travels across the network.  In the first case, once the attacker has obtained the 
“encrypted” password, the attacker can attempt to “crack” the password using his or her 
own computing resources.  Tools that perform password cracking attacks generally start 
with a dictionary attack before attempting a brute force attack, as dictionary attacks have 
historically proven to be effective [Yan 2001].  The use of encryption protocols like 
Secure Shell [Loshin 2001], Transport Layer Security [Dierks 1999], and Virtual Private 
Networks [Ferguson 1998] make intercepting the “encrypted” password more difficult, 
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since the communication must first be decrypted before the “encrypted” password can be 
obtained. In addition, most systems are now storing “encrypted” passwords in such a way 
that only system administrators can access them [Feldmeier 1990].  A far more 
sophisticated attacker might ignore passwords entirely, instead installing a rootkit to 
maintain access to a compromised system [Levine 2004].  As discussed in Chapter IV, 
future work related to the scenario developed for this research could include adapting it to 
a different style of attack. 
E. CYBERCIEGE 
CyberCIEGE is a simulation game for the Microsoft Windows platform that 
places the player in the role of Information Technology Manager for an organization.  
The game is designed to teach key information assurance concepts and practices, and is 
extensible to allow developers to create scenarios targeted to specific audiences and 
topics.  A game-specific Scenario Definition Language is used to create scenarios.  
Generally, the player is required to make choices regarding physical, technical, and 
procedural security to defend the assets of the simulated organization from attackers 
[Irvine 2005]. 
The game is based around a three-dimensional overhead view of the office of the 
organization under the player’s control.  Additional screens provide the player with the 
tools to define and configure the organization’s IT infrastructure, which includes 
computers, networks, and other network-related equipment.  The organization contains 
virtual users who use the infrastructure to meet their goals.  If a virtual user cannot meet 
his or her goals, his or her productivity decreases, causing the organization to lose 
money.  Zones can be used to restrict the movement of virtual users around the office, 
placing different requirements for access on different portions of the office. 
In addition to supporting users who need to meet goals, the infrastructure also 
needs to protect the assets of the organization.  Assets are stored on computers, and if 
they are not sufficiently protected, motivated attackers will compromise them.  Assets 
have a motive value assigned to them, providing a mechanism for the scenario developer 
to define how far an attacker will go in order to compromise the asset.  The higher an 
asset’s motive value, the more sophisticated an attacker’s methods become, requiring the 
player to deploy more thorough, and potentially more expensive, defenses to protect the 
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asset.  Assets also have a cost associated with them, indicating the loss the organization 
incurs if the asset is compromised.  Virtual user goals generally entail the reading and/or 
modification of assets. 
Each scenario can be split into several phases, each with its own objectives that 
the player must complete before proceeding to the next phase.  These phases provide a 
mechanism that can be used to represent changes over time, and to place events into a set 
sequence.  Objectives can be defined in terms of goals achieved by virtual users or in 
terms of the player configuring components to enforce a particular security posture. 
The game also includes conditions that are assessed during play, and triggers that 
cause a particular action to occur.  When the set of conditions associated with a trigger is 
met, that action occurs.  These triggers include actions such as winning or losing the 
game, progressing to the next phase, an attack on an asset, and the display of a message 
to the player. 
Player motivation is provided by having player choices affect the user’s budget.  
Productive virtual users make money for the organization and can increase the budget, 
while unproductive users and successful attacks lose money, decreasing the player’s 
available funds.  Making changes to policies, purchasing equipment, providing training to 
virtual users, and salaries for guards and IT staff all cost money, which is deducted from 
the budget, forcing the player to consider his or her options.  Many scenarios cause the 
player to lose if the organization or player’s budget runs out of money. 
The elements described above are defined for the game using the Scenario 
Definition Language. Because it encompasses the wide variety of options available to 
scenario developers, the language is complex.  To assist scenario developers in creating 
their scenarios, the CyberCIEGE Scenario Definition Tool was written [Johns 2004].  
This application provides a forms-based interface to the Scenario Definition Language. It 
helps developers avoid syntactic errors when defining scenarios. 
For this project, CyberCIEGE is used as a simulation platform to allow players to 
explore different possible password policies and what effect those policies could have on 
an organization. 
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F. THESIS QUESTION 
Can a scenario for the CyberCIEGE game be constructed to train and educate 
users, system administrators, and computer security students in issues related to 
authentication and password policies? 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided an overview of the role passwords and password 
policies play in user authentication to computer systems.  The next chapter describes the 
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II. DEVELOPMENT METHODOLOGY AND SCENARIO 
DISCUSSION 
This chapter will discuss how the CyberCIEGE game may be used to educate 
users on the authentication and password policy issues outlined in Chapter I. 
A. REQUIREMENTS 
The basic requirement was to develop an educational scenario to teach users about 
some of the issues involved in developing user authentication and password policies.  It 
was an additional requirement that the scenario be enjoyable to the user as a game, and 
not be seen as a purely educational presentation.  Users are less likely to become as 
engaged in an educational tool as they would be with something that feels like a game, as 
there is now virtually an entire generation of people who find games an immensely 
compelling and rewarding experience [Garris 2002]. 
The primary goal of the scenario was to teach the player the effects of password 
policy choices.  In particular, it was desired to show that while problems can result from 
having weak policies, as most people would expect, issues could also arise from having a 
very strict policy.  The scenario would focus on a low motive attack, as an attacker with a 
higher motive would likely start looking at other methods to achieve their goals, such as 
looking for application vulnerabilities or social engineering. An Internet connection is 
included, since many small businesses would likely consider it essential, even if the 
business case for Internet connection is not well grounded.  The Internet connection will 
also facilitate the external attack.  The value of user training as well as the role that the 
review of system logs plays in identifying intrusion attempts will also be addressed. 
As scenario planning proceeded, it was determined that the design of the 
CyberCIEGE game would not permit a fully realistic simulation of password policies and 
procedures; in particular, the game does not offer the same level of granularity that a real 
system does.  For example, in a real system an administrator is able to set exact values for 
minimum and maximum password length, whereas in the game there are only the options 
“short”, “medium”, and “long”. Furthermore, in most real systems password policy 
selections might have no discernable effect for long periods of time.  But to keep the 
player’s attention and make the desired points, the game must provide quick feedback to 
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player choices, and as a result the impact of the player’s choices is felt almost 
immediately.  Therefore the scenario is a low fidelity simulation:  Rather than providing 
an exact reproduction of the options a system administrator might have to work with, as 
would be the case in a high fidelity simulation, abstractions were made to emphasize the 
concepts most related to authentication [Prensky 2001]. 
The CyberCIEGE game provides three different configuration options related to 
password configuration that the player is able to set:  Password length, complexity of the 
character set, and change frequency.  These options are shown in Figures 1 and 2.  For 
password length, the player can select between “short”, “medium”, and “long”.  The 
player also has the ability to select none of these options, which represents a choice of not 
requiring a password. For the complexity requirement, the player can select “any”, 
meaning there is no complexity requirement, or “moderate” or “complex”, with 
increasing complexity requirements.  Increasing complexity means more use of mixed 
case letters, numbers, and non-alphanumeric symbols.  For password change frequency, 
the player is able to select from “2 months”, “6 months”, “1 year”, or “never”.  This 
setting controls the time interval between the computer requiring users to change their 
passwords.  In addition to these items, the game also has procedural settings to indicate 
whether or not users are allowed to write down their passwords. 
It was also determined that the scenario should not function in a “sudden death” 
manner where the player loses the moment an incorrect choice is made.  Instead, the 
player should be allowed time to try different configurations to determine which ones are 
appropriate for the situation.  However, failure to determine an appropriate configuration 
within a predetermined time will cause the player to lose. 
In order to simplify the scenario and better control the player’s experience, it was 
decided to structure the scenario so that the built-in attacks would not be used.  Instead, 
attacks were developed using conditions and triggers.  The capability for the scenario 
developer to selectively enable the game engine’s built-in attacks was not a feature of the 
underlying simulation engine until the scenario was well into development. 
Feedback while the scenario is being played takes two different forms.  Popup 
messages provide a narrative description of the events of the game as they progress, 
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while monetary bonuses and penalties are given as the player meets the goals of the game 
or allow negative events to occur, respectively. 
B. DESCRIPTION OF DEVELOPED SCENARIO 
The developed scenario is set in a fictional retail business that comes under a 
cyber attack from a competitor.  In the role of IT administrator, it is the player’s job to 
configure the company’s computers in a manner that will fend off the attack. 
1. Scenario Overview 
As the scenario starts, Tom’s Tools has just hired the player as their new IT 
administrator.  In the first of the scenario’s two phases, the player needs to configure the 
password settings on two machines: the workstations used by the virtual users Tom, the 
owner of the store, and Jane, who handles most of the sales and customer contact tasks at 
the store.  These settings are currently the focus of attention, as system logs show 
numerous unsuccessful attempts to remotely log into their workstations. 
Because the store is small, with very few employees, remote access must be 
enabled so that the staff members are able to access their data and perform work even 
while away from the store.  In addition to their brick and mortar store presence, Tom’s 
Tools also sells online, thus the web site and mail server, hosted off site at a web hosting 
facility, needs to be accessible from the store workstations. 
Once an acceptable password configuration is reached, the scenario moves into its 
second phase.  The attacks are determined to be coming from Hammer House, a 
competitor, and are targeting the store’s computer inventory, stored on a server on-site 
and accessible from both Tom’s and Jane’s workstations.  With this information, it is 
determined that the attacks need to be taken seriously and that the organization needs to 
move to a higher level of security—in this case, setting password requirements to their 
highest settings. 
Once the player passes the second phase, the game finishes. 
2. Scenario Walkthrough 
When the game starts, the workstations are set at minimum default configurations.  
If the settings remain too low, the attackers will be able to successfully penetrate the 
system, causing the store to lose money.  Since Jane’s access to the inventory is limited to 
viewing the inventory and changing the quantity of items in stock as a result of sales and 
returns, compromising her computer has a lower cost than compromising Tom’s, which 
has the additional capabilities of adding and removing items from inventory as well as 
changing prices. 
If the password settings are set too high, Tom and Jane will forget their passwords 
and a small cost will be incurred, representing the need for the system administrator to 
reset a password.  If the configuration option allowing passwords to be written down is 
set, Tom and Jane may write them down to avoid forgetting them; however, non-
employees in the store, such as customers, might see the written passwords, which will 
lead to a compromise of the inventory. 
For the first phase, an acceptable password setting is any combination of 
password length, complexity, and change frequency with the exception of all settings at 
their lowest or highest.  An example of an acceptable password setting to pass the first 
phase, shown in Figure 1, is “medium” password length, “moderate” character set 
complexity, and passwords must be changed every six months. 
 
Figure 1.   Example password settings to pass the first phase. 
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When the second phase is reached, the environment under which the company is 
operating has changed, thus the security settings need to change.  In this case, the 
password length, complexity, and change frequency all need to be set at their highest 
settings, and writing down passwords needs to be forbidden.  If the user fails to adjust the 
password settings, the attackers will eventually succeed, causing the player to lose.  In 
order to avoid the problems of users forgetting their passwords, additional training will 
have to be purchased.  The reason for this is that with the training, the users will have a 
better understanding of the security issues involved, and thus will make more of an effort 
to remember more complicated passwords [Adams 1999].  The password settings 
required to pass the second phase, shown in Figure 2, are “long” password length, 
“complex” character set complexity, and passwords must be changed every two months. 
 
Figure 2.   Example password settings to pass the second phase. 
 
3. Relationship to Real World Concepts 
The first phase of the scenario is meant to represent a typical security situation, 
where the needs for computer security must be balanced against the willingness and 
ability of employees without significant computer security training to comply with 
computer security policies. 
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The second phase is meant to represent a situation where the security 
requirements of the situation exceed the user’s ability to comply with them.  When that 
happens, the user becomes the weak link in the chain, and “fixing” users is not something 
a system administrator can do with a few clicks of a mouse.  Instead, the users have to be 
trained.  Although expensive, training is necessary for the organization to succeed. 
The individual settings that the player must select, in particular during the second 
phase, are not intended to convey exact settings that the user should copy verbatim to 
real-world systems.  Rather, they are meant to convey the general security posture of the 
organization at the time.  In the first phase, the appropriate posture is one where the 
settings are neither too weak nor too strong.  The second phase is meant to convey a 
change in the environment that requires a move to a high security posture.  In particular, 
this abstraction is seen in the setting for password change frequency which would, in 
reality, have little effect for a temporary change in the organization’s security posture that 
spans a period of hours to days, as portrayed in the scenario.  However, if this change 
were to span a period of months or years, then increasing the password change frequency 
might be a relevant step to take. 
As a result of this, the exact meanings of the relative terms used for the password 
settings, in particular “short”, “medium”, and “long” for password length and “any”, 
“moderate”, and “complex” for character complexity are not important.  Rather, it is the 
impact that these differences have on security that is emphasized.  The decision to use 
these relative terms was made on the basis of ease of presentation and to allow their exact 
meanings to be left open for the scenario developer to determine [Thompson 2005].  For 
this scenario, it is not necessary to assign an exact meaning. 
Nevertheless, it may be constructive to give examples of what might be 
considered reasonable interpretations for these definitions at the time of writing.  For 
password length, “short” might mean a password at least four characters long, “medium” 
might mean at least seven characters long, and “long” might mean more than at least ten 
characters long.  For character complexity, “any” means that there is no restrictions 
placed on the password, “moderate” might mean that the password cannot be a name or 
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dictionary word, and “complex” might require the use of both upper and lower case 
letters along with at least one number and one non-alphanumeric symbol. 
As the scenario attempts to convey, the definition of what is a reasonable 
password policy depends on the risks and threats that face an organization.  An attacker 
with a high motivation to break into a system will apply more time, effort, and resources 
to doing so.  A small retail organization like the one depicted in the scenario is not likely 
to hold much interest for most attackers, thus the organization does not face a high threat.  
For this type of organization, a moderate password policy of requiring at least seven 
character passwords that are not dictionary words and are changed every six months is 
likely to be sufficient. 
C. SCENARIO TESTING 
Initial testing of the scenario was performed during development and by one of 
the advisors.  Upon completion of the scenario, students who were also working on 
CyberCIEGE were invited to test the scenario by playing it and providing feedback. 
1. Testing During Development 
Development of the scenario was iterative, where a few elements of the scenario 
were created, then built and run to ensure that they functioned as desired.  The process 
was repeated as more elements were incorporated.  Occasionally, previously created 
elements would have to be changed and then retested, either due to changing 
requirements in the developing scenario or due to changes in the CyberCIEGE game, 
which was still evolving as scenario development progressed. 
During this phase, testing was performed by playing the scenario and visually 
verifying that the desired functionality was present.  For example, at one point scrolling 
messages were added to the ticker at the bottom of the screen to help convey the image of 
an active retail store.  Once the messages were added, the game was run without player 
interference and the messages were observed. 
2. User Testing 
Once scenario development was complete, it was installed on a server that 
provided the CyberCIEGE game on a shared folder.  Students involved in the 
CyberCIEGE project were then invited to play the scenario and provide feedback.  
Copies of the player evaluations are attached in Appendix B.  The CyberCIEGE 
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Campaign Analyzer was also used for an objective assessment of how the testers played 
the scenario. 
Overall, users seemed to grasp the basic concept of the scenario: that it was 
attempting to explore issues related to the creation of a password policy and individual 
passwords.  Users seemed to think the educational aspects were there, though some felt 
more instruction was needed.  As to whether or not it was enjoyable as a game, there 
were mixed reactions, with users indicating that more direction to the player was needed.  
Users also reported that it was possible to pass the first phase by configuring only Jane’s 
workstation, which is not what the scenario intended.  There were also reports of a crash 
when the “Zone” tab in the game was selected; this problem was traced to a configuration 
file that was missing when the scenario was installed on the server. 
Of the five games played, two were played to completion.  In both cases, the 
player lost.  In once case, the player ran out of money, and in the second, the player did 
not make all of the necessary configuration changes, and as a result fell victim to a 
successful attempt by the attackers to modify the store’s inventory.  In the other three 
sessions, the players terminated the game before it was complete.  In two of these cases, 
the player quit while in the second phase, once after the attackers were able to read the 
store inventory, an event with a high cost but not normally resulting in immediate loss.  
In the final case, the player quit the game while still in the first phase. 
D. SUMMARY 
The result of this process was the creation of a scenario that gives the player 
insight into some of the issues involved when crafting a password policy.  It is intended 
that this scenario become part of a larger collection of scenarios to complement an 
introductory computer security course or other overview of computer security issues.  
Additionally, this scenario was the first to be developed from the outset using the 
CyberCIEGE Scenario Definition Tool [Johns 2004]; a discussion of this process follows 
in the next chapter. 
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III. SCENARIO DEFINITION TOOL BETA TEST 
The CyberCIEGE game includes a robust text-based Scenario Definition 
Language that is used to create scenarios [Irvine 2004].  However, with this robustness 
comes complexity, and complexity can make it difficult for people to write scenarios for 
the game [Johns 2004].  A program that runs under Microsoft Windows, commonly 
referred to as the Scenario Definition Tool or SDT, was designed and implemented that 
provides a point-and-click forms-based interface for the creation of scenarios.  The 
scenario implemented in conjunction with this thesis was among the first to be created 
with the SDT.  In addition, it involved a person who did not have significant experience 
in scenario creation by direct manipulation of the raw Scenario Definition Language. 
A. HOW THE SDT WAS USED AND TESTED 
Formal testing and verification of the SDT was not conducted for this thesis.  
Rather, the tool was used to develop the scenario, with correct functioning of the scenario 
in CyberCIEGE used as an indication that the SDT was properly generating the scenario.  
The testing model is most closely compared to the commercial software concept of a beta 
test, where software close to the final product is provided to users to test it in real 
conditions [Neff 2003].  As a result, testing of the SDT was performed as part of the 
same iterative testing cycles that were used to test the scenario itself.  When a problem 
was uncovered, it was reported to the SDT developers, and when a new version intended 
to resolve the problem was released, it was tested to verify that the tool exhibited 
improved functionality. 
In particular, testing of the SDT was focused on finding problems in three major 
areas: interface, consistency, and proper scenario generation. 
1. Interface Testing 
Interface testing was intended to test the visual and user interaction elements of 
the SDT.  This covered the basic usability and usefulness of the tool.  Usability is an 
indication of how the system interacts with the user [Ferré 2001].  Usefulness is how a 
system enhances the ability of a user to complete a task [Davis 1989]. 
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Specific aspects of the SDT that were checked for usability and usefulness 
included any commands or sequence of commands that would cause the tool to crash, 
clarity of user interface elements and how they functioned, and consistency in user 
interface design.  Each of these will be discussed below. 
The overall stability of the tool seemed good.  There was one case where the tool 
could be caused to crash on a regular basis, as detailed in the following section.  Early 
versions of the tool did contain user interface elements, such as menu commands, for 
functionality that was not yet fully implemented, but there was no built-in indication that 
this was the case other than selecting the command and observing that nothing happened.  
As these functions were implemented, this ceased to be an issue. 
The clarity of the user interface elements was another area that was examined 
through testing.  In this area the tool did have some shortcomings.  In particular, the 
design tended to assume the developer was familiar with the syntax of the scenario 
definition language, as there were several places that did not give any indication of what 
the appropriate input values were.  Having a copy of the scenario definition language 
[Rivermind 2004] was helpful.  To remedy this problem, a help menu entry to display the 
language specification was added to the SDT.  A basic developer’s guide has since been 
written which provides an overview of the tool, which is a helpful addition to the separate 
language specification [CISR 2005]. 
The final major area addressed by interface testing was consistency in the user 
interface.  Overall consistency within the tool was good, but it does fall short of meeting 
published user interface guidelines for Windows applications [Microsoft 2004].  In 
particular, there were problems with the use of checkboxes versus radio buttons as 
described below.  Additionally, guidelines regarding the format of menu items had not 
been followed, namely the use of ellipsis after the name of a menu item that will present a 
dialog box for further user interaction before the command is completed, and disabled 
menu items in certain contexts. 
2. Consistency Testing 
Consistency testing was primarily concerned with evaluating whether or not the 
SDT properly saves and restores developer-supplied data.  The scenario was developed 
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over many different sessions.  Closing the scenario and then opening it later and finding it 
the same as it was before indicated that the SDT was properly saving and restoring its 
own state.  Several versions of the SDT operated on the same scenario data without loss, 
and the directory containing the data was transportable between different computers 
running the SDT.  No major issues in these areas were found. 
3. Proper Scenario Generation 
Testing for proper scenario generation was used to determine if the SDT was 
generating valid, playable scenario definition files.  The code for these files was 
generated primarily from fixed code associated with the various objects included in the 
scenario, with various portions supplied in developer-entered fields. 
The fixed code did not generate problems, however there were times when a fixed 
object depended on another object that was not present in the scenario.  Earlier versions 
of the SDT that did not include any validation checking would generate an invalid 
scenario definition file.  Later versions that included validation checking were able to 
check for missing dependencies and report them to the developer. 
Developer-supplied text presented a more serious problem.  Many of the fields 
were simple text boxes that gave no indication of the type and range of permitted values.  
A copy of the scenario definition language documentation [Rivermind 2004] was 
necessary in order to determine the appropriate values.  As with the fixed code mentioned 
previously, the earlier versions of the SDT that did not include validation checking could 
generate invalid scenario definition files, while later versions included validation 
checking to guide the developer in correcting problems. 
Problems with the scenario definition file can be caught in three places.  Initially, 
there was no validation, and problems would either cause that element of the scenario 
definition file to be ignored or cause the game to crash.  When the game crashed, a file 
named crash.txt was generated, and could be used to help diagnose the problem.  
Validation checking was later added in two locations: as part of the game itself, and in 
the SDT.  Problems caught by in-game validation still cause the game to quit, with a file 
named parseErrors.txt generated to provide information about the cause of the problem.  
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Validation within the SDT can be run before the scenario definition file is generated, and 
can assist the developer in finding errors prior to game execution. 
B. SDT ISSUES 
Some of the issues uncovered during testing of the SDT and how these issues 
were responded to are described below. 
1. Some File Menu Commands Do Not Function 
It was discovered that the “Open Scenario” command in the “File” menu as well 
as the commands in the “New” submenu did not function.  The “Open Scenario” 
command was repaired for the next revision of the SDT.  The “New” submenu problem 
required more work, but a temporary workaround that consisted of right-clicking on the 
desired descriptor in the Reusable Sets Library section of the SDT window and selecting 
“New” from the pop-up menu was used until the problem was fixed. 
2. Adherence to User Interface Guidelines 
The SDT contained multiple violations of the published user interface guidelines 
for Windows applications [Microsoft 2004].  The Scenario Information screen on the 
SDT contained four radio buttons labeled “Use Small Office”, “Use Work Office”, 
“Internet”, and “Static Network”.  Each option functioned as an individual on-off switch, 
and thus should be checkboxes instead of radio buttons, as radio buttons are used to select 
one from a set of mutually exclusive choices.  The office-related buttons were ultimately 
changed to popup menus to allow scenario developers more flexibility in using different 
office configurations. 
Several menu items, notably “Open Scenario”, “Save As”, and “Save Scenario 
As” in the “File” menu and “Import SDF”, “Project Settings”, and “Clone Project” in the 
“Tools” menu, present a dialog box for further developer input before the command can 
be executed.  User interface guidelines call for the use of ellipsis at the end of the menu 
item in this situation, but the ellipses were not present. 
There were situations where certain menu items do not apply.  In particular, the 
“Save As” command does not apply if the Scenario tab is currently selected.  In this case, 
and other cases where the current context precludes the use of a particular menu item, the 
menu item should be disabled so that the developer cannot select it. 
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3. “Save Scenario As” with Open Descriptors Causes Crash 
When attempting to use the “Save Scenario As” command in the “File” menu to 
save a copy of the current scenario with a different name, the SDT would crash if there 
were any open descriptor tabs.  A temporary workaround was to close the open tabs 
before saving.  The problem was remedied in the next revision of the SDT. 
4. Missing Scroll Bars on Text Boxes 
Two text boxes that allow a significant amount of text to be entered were missing 
scroll bars, and, as a result, did not scroll beyond the displayed text area.  The two boxes 
were the “Initial Briefing” text box on the Scenario tab and the “Message” text box on the 
Trigger tab for the Set Phase trigger class.  These text boxes were corrected in the next 
revision of the SDT. 
C. HOW THE SDT SUPPORTED SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT 
The SDT was found to be an excellent aid in developing the scenario.  While 
familiarity with the Scenario Definition Language was still needed to fully understand 
and utilize the features available in CyberCIEGE, using the SDT still provided substantial 
assistance.  With the SDT, it was not necessary to know the exact syntax of the language; 
a familiarity with the various options was sufficient.  As a result, less time was spent 
developing small scenarios to help learn the details of the language, allowing additional 
time to focus on development of the full scenario for this project. 
When development of the scenario first began, the SDT had very limited ability to 
validate that the scenario being developed did not contain any errors or missing 
components.  As a result, it could generate a scenario that would cause the CyberCIEGE 
game to crash, as the game has a limited tolerance for errors in the scenario definition 
file.  As development of the SDT continued, the addition of validation features in the 
SDT and in the game proved to be valuable in improving and debugging the scenario. 
D. SDT TEST PLAN 
Although formal testing and verification of the SDT was not a part of this project, 
a test plan was developed, which has laid the groundwork for a more formal test.  It is 
expected that future work will use this plan to develop complete test procedures for 
rigorous testing of the SDT.  The purpose of this testing is to ensure that the SDT 
properly generates scenario definition files.  The game can be assumed to properly 
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interpret scenario definition files.  Either visual inspection of the generated files or 
execution of the scenario in the game can be used to verify correct scenario generation. 
1. Test Plan Philosophy 
The number of fields and elements in the SDT make exhaustive testing of every 
possible value and combination for each field infeasible.  The beta test described earlier 
in this chapter indicates that the basic generation of scenarios appears to be correct.  The 
focus of the testing should be on the items that have a major impact on a scenario, and 
areas that have not been extensively examined via beta testing.  Previous testing had 
already validated that the CyberCIEGE game produces the expected results from a 
scenario definition file [LaMore 2004].  Test procedures developed from this plan should 
make clear the outcome that is expected from correct functioning of the SDT.  
2. Menu Command Testing 
The “File” menu contains the typical “New”, “Open”, “Close”, “Save”, and 
“Exit” commands.  Each of these should be tested to ensure that the application behaves 
correctly.  For example, if a change is saved, the scenario should then be closed and re-
opened to ensure that the save was successful. 
Commands in the “View” and “Help” menus bring up information in helper 
applications such as WordPad, Notepad, and Adobe Acrobat Reader.  These commands 
should each be tested to ensure that the appropriate information is displayed. 
The majority of testing should focus on the commands in the “Tools” menu.  
Testing for each command is described below. 
a. Build 
The “Build” command takes the current scenario and generates a Scenario 
Definition File (SDF) that the CyberCIEGE game executes.  This function can be tested 
by loading or developing a scenario in the SDT, then building it and either running it in 
the game to see if it functions as expected, or by visual inspection of the generated SDF.  
The expected output generated by the Build command can be determined by comparing 
the SDF to the correct syntax of the language as defined in the Scenario Format Template 
(SFT) document [Rivermind 2004].  Testing of the Build command should demonstrate 
that all significant fields within the SDT are properly represented in the generated SDF. 
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b. Run 
The “Run” command executes the CyberCIEGE game with the current 
scenario.  It should be tested to ensure that it functions as expected. 
c. Import SDF 
The “Import SDF” command imports an SDF that was generated 
elsewhere and opens it in the SDT, allowing a developer to edit it.  This command can be 
tested by playing a scenario and making various choices.  The game should then be 
saved, which generates a new SDF.  This SDF should then be imported into the SDT, 
which should then be used to build a new SDF, and this SDF should be visually 
compared to the one saved by the game. 
d. Project Settings 
The “Project Settings” command brings up a window that allows the 
developer to edit project-related settings.  These are the directories in the file system 
where the project, CyberCIEGE game, and the user’s preferred program for viewing text 
files are located.  This should be tested to ensure that any changes made to project 
settings are properly applied. 
e. Validate 
The “Validate” command checks the current scenario for errors including 
invalid field values and missing dependencies.  The SFT document should be examined 
to determine appropriate values for each field to be tested.  Particular attention should be 
paid to border cases (values near the allowed minimum and maximum) and type 
mismatches, such as entering a string when a numeric value is required.  The tester will 
expect the command to report errors when an inappropriate value is entered into a field, 
and not report an error when a value is correct. 
f. Clone Project 
The “Clone Project” command creates a copy of the existing project.  This 
command should be tested by using it on an existing project, then comparing the two 
projects to verify that the original project and the copy are the same.  A tool that can 
compare a file or set of files for differences, such as CSDiff [ComponentSoftware 2005], 
may be useful for this testing. 
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g. Validate / Build / Run 
The “Validate / Build / Run” command is provided as a convenience to the 
developer.  It first validates a scenario for correctness, then builds it, and finally runs it in 
the CyberCIEGE game.  This command should be tested by first using it, and then 
separately executing each command to ensure they produce the same results. 
3. Scenario Element Testing 
Due to the number of fields included in the SDT, it is unlikely that resources will 
be available to test each one.  The sections below detail specific elements that merit 
special attention, as they do not appear to have been used extensively to date.  These tests 
should be performed as part of testing the “Build” and “Validate” functions described 
above. 
Many of the fields can be tested by simple inspection in the game, by setting a 
value in a field and then running the game and visually verifying that the value is 
properly reflected.  Where there is a set of checkboxes, each can be tested by setting all 
of the checkboxes to on, then running the game to note that all of the appropriate options 
are set.  They can then be set to off, the game can be run again, and visually verified that 
they are no longer set. 
a. Scenario Tab 
The Scenario tab holds basic information that applies to the entire 
scenario.  Much of the information on this tab is simply presented verbatim in the game, 
such as the briefing text.  Areas that should be focused on are the Attack Masks section as 
well as the NonServerDefaultPublic, End on Compromise, Easy Training, Easy ACLs, 
Use Catalog, Networks Everywhere, and Guards Cost at Startup options. 
b. Asset Tab 
The Asset tab is used to define the assets in a scenario.  Areas that should 
be focused on are the Access Control List and Cost List sections, by creating various 
entries in the Access Control and Costs Lists and ensuring that they are properly 
generated and reflected in the game. 
c. Catalog Component Tab 
The Catalog Component tab is used to define the hardware devices that are 
available for the player to purchase.  The Configuration Settings section of this tab, used 
31 
to create the default settings for a component, should be focused on, and can be tested by 
using the all-on, all-off method described in section D.3. 
d. Condition Tab 
The Condition tab is used to define conditions that the game tests for 
during execution of a scenario.  Only the AssignedComputerHas, UserTraining, 
ObjectiveCompleted, and PhaseCompleted conditions have been extensively tested.  The 
other conditions require additional testing.  These can be tested by creating one of each 
type of condition, then verifying by inspection of the generated scenario definition file 
that each condition was properly generated and matches the expected syntax as defined in 
the Scenario Format Template. 
e. DAC Group Tab 
The DAC Group tab is used to define the discretionary access control 
groups available in the scenario.  It has just one element on it and does not require 
extensive testing. 
f. Department Tab 
The Department tab is used to define the employee departments available 
in the scenario.  There are no elements on it other than the name of the department, so 
additional testing is not needed. 
g. Filter Tab 
The Filter tab is used to define firewall rules.  This function is currently 
being tested as part of another thesis that focuses on the use of filters. 
h. Goal Tab 
The Goal tab is used to define the goals that can be assigned to virtual 
users in the scenario.  The assignment of goals to specific virtual users is performed in 
the User tab of the SDT.  While the SDT has been tested with relatively simple goals 
involving a single asset or Software element, testing of goals that entail several assets and 
different Software elements is needed.  Additionally, the “Filtered Software” section 
needs to be tested.  These can be tested by using the SDT to construct a goal with several 
assets, Software elements, and Filtered Software elements.  The resulting scenario 
definition file should be visually inspected to determine whether or not the generated goal 
matches the expected syntax as described in the Scenario Format Template. 
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i. Integrity Tab 
The Integrity tab is used to define the levels of integrity that can be 
applied to assets.  It needs to be tested by creating various integrity levels and examining 
them in the Integrity section of the Security Labels window in the game. 
j. Network Tab 
The Network tab is used to define the networks available for the player to 
use to connect computer and other network components together.  As networks are 
simply named wires, further testing is not needed. 
k. Objective Tab 
The Objective tab is used to define the objectives that the player will need 
to meet in order to win the game.  This tab is fairly straightforward, but testing is needed 
to determine if an objective can span multiple phases.  This is accomplished by creating 
such an objective, then visually inspecting the generated scenario definition file to 
determine whether or not the generated objective matches the expected syntax as 
described in the Scenario Format Template. 
l. Component Network Connection Tab 
The Component Network Connection tab is used to define the security 
properties associated with the connection of a network component to a network.  This has 
not been extensively used and needs to be tested.  The User Group World section can 
only be tested by inspection of the generated scenario definition file, since it is not 
currently used in the game.  The Access Control List and MAC Connection Settings 
sections can be tested by creating entries and confirming their presence in the Network 
section of the Component tab in the game. 
m. Procedural Settings Tab 
The Procedural Settings tab is used to define the settings that are 
referenced by physical components and zones.  These settings are used to configure 
components at the start of the game and are applied to any hardware purchased and 
placed within a zone.  This has not been extensively used and needs to be tested.  The 
Boolean Procedural Settings section can be tested by the all-on, all-off method described 
in section D.3.  The other settings are ranges that can be tested by selecting various 
values and confirming their settings in the game. 
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n. Phase Tab 
The Phase tab is used to define the different phases of a scenario.  Each 
phase can contain different objectives that must be met before the phase can be 
completed.  This tab is fairly straightforward and extensive testing is not needed. 
o. Physical Component Tab 
The Physical Component tab is used to define the hardware devices that 
are present when the scenario starts.  While it has been used, the majority of the fields 
have not been used extensively and need to be tested.  The checkboxes in the 
Configuration Settings section can be tested by the all-on, all-off method described in 
section D.3. 
p. Secrecy Tab 
The Secrecy tab is used to define the levels of secrecy that can be applied 
to assets. It needs to be tested by creating various secrecy levels and examining them in 
the Secrecy section of the Security Labels window in the game. 
q. SupportStaff Tab 
The SupportStaff tab is used to define virtual characters that perform 
security and IT support functions for virtual users.  This has been used but some 
additional testing is needed.   In particular, virtual characters with various attributes need 
to be tested by creating some support staff characters with various values. The resulting 
scenario definition file should be visually inspected to determine whether or not the 
generated virtual character matches the expected syntax as described in the Scenario 
Format Template. 
r. Trigger Tab 
The Trigger tab is used to define events that occur when a certain 
condition or set of conditions is met.  It has been used, but it needs testing to ensure that 
the proper fields appear for each Trigger Class, and that the runsWhilePaused and Trigger 
Firing Condition Values work correctly as these are newer and are not well tested. 
Triggers can be tested by creating one of each type of trigger, then verifying by 
inspection of the generated scenario definition file that each trigger was properly 
generated and matches the expected syntax as described in the Scenario Format 
Template. 
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s. User Tab 
The User tab is used to define the virtual users in the scenario.  Because 
this option has been used a lot, the primary areas that should be checked are the 
Department, Secrecy, Cost, and Integrity Fields.  These can be tested by setting various 
values and visually verifying that they are properly reflected in the User tab of the game. 
t. Workspace Tab 
The Workspace tab is used to define the positions that furniture and virtual 
users can be assigned to.  This can be tested by creating various locations within a 
scenario, assigning users and furniture to them, and verifying their correct placement in 
the game.  The Refresh button updates the User and Computer columns to show the 
placement of these objects in the current scenario, and can be tested by setting various 
user and component locations in their respective tabs, and then clicking the Refresh 
button to verify that it shows the correct placement.  The Import button does not need to 
be tested further. 
u. Zone Tab 
The Zone tab is used to define the security zones for the scenario, and is 
closely associated with the Procedural Settings tab.  Checkboxes can be tested by using 
the all-on, all-off method described in section D.3. Other fields can be tested by selecting 
various options in a scenario and visually confirming their settings in the game. 
E. SUMMARY 
The SDT proved to be an invaluable tool in creating the scenario.  As 
development and testing progressed, bug fixes and feature additions improved the 
usefulness of the tool. 
The test plan developed follows two general approaches to testing.  Both involve 
creating scenario elements in the SDT, then checking to ensure the SDT properly 
generated the scenario.  The first is by running the resulting scenario in the game, and 
visually verifying the correct values are present.  This may be preferable since it also 
provides a check that the syntax of the scenario is correct.  However, some items lead to 
more complicated behavior that may be difficult to predict.  In this case, the scenario can 
be checked by visual inspection of the scenario definition file itself and comparing it to 
the Scenario Format Template’s specification for the syntax of the element being tested. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A.  SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
As this project progressed, it became clear that there were several items that lend 
themselves to future work, not just in the scenario but also in the SDT and the 
CyberCIEGE game. 
1. Scenario 
There are several elements of the scenario that could use further improvement.  
These can be grouped broadly into three categories: feature enhancements, improving 
realism, and improving playability. 
a. Feature Enhancements 
During development of the scenario, new features were added to the 
CyberCIEGE game and to the scenario definition language.  Time considerations 
prevented some of these features from being incorporated into the scenario.  The 
pertinent features are discussed below. 
Perhaps most critically, the game added the option for players to not 
require a password.  The scenario should be updated to take this into account when 
evaluating the policies that the player has set.  Specifically, conditions that test for the 
player having selected the option of not requiring a password need to be created.  To 
support this, the triggers that check for various settings will need to include these 
conditions. 
One new feature is balloon messages, where text appears connected to 
virtual users on the screen via cartoon-style speech balloons.  Some of the messages that 
currently appear in the scenario as popup text messages could be converted to use these 
balloon messages.  One possible candidate for this would be messages related to virtual 
users forgetting their passwords. 
Another new feature is the ability for the scenario to alter the text that 
appears as a virtual user’s thoughts in the sidebar of the Office tab.  In the current 
scenario, these messages are being generated from the game engine, and were not paid 
attention to during scenario development.  These game-generated thoughts could be 
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misleading to players as they may not reflect the direction the scenario’s storyline takes, 
and the scenario should be updated to generate thoughts that are aligned with the plot.  In 
the same vein, the scenario should alter virtual user happiness levels to reflect the events 
that occur in the game. 
Finally, the capability for the scenario to provide a quiz to the player 
between phases was added.  Since this is an education-oriented scenario, it may be 
appropriate to add some quiz questions to the scenario. 
b. Improving Realism 
The scenario is currently built around an attack strategy based on a direct 
brute force attack, which is unlikely to pose a serious threat to an organization since it 
can be easily prevented with an account lockout policy.  Realism in the scenario could 
thus be improved by changing the attacker strategy; however, care would be needed in 
the design of a new attack strategy to ensure it does not distract the player from the 
educational goals of the scenario.  There are a couple of different approaches that could 
be taken to developing a new attack strategy. 
The first approach would be to redesign the scenario around a different, 
more sophisticated attack.  Depending on the new attack, this may be as simple as 
changing some of the dialog presented to the player. 
The other approach that could be taken would be to alter the scenario to 
take advantage of the attacks built into the game engine.  In order for this to work, it 
would be necessary to ensure that the game engine contains attacks that are appropriate to 
the educational goals of the scenario, and that the scenario enables only those attacks. 
There is also concern that the scenario could lead the player to make 
unrealistic conclusions about password policies, such as concluding that a password 
needs to be changed every two months.  One possible way to address this would be to 
emphasize that the policy required to pass the second phase is an exceptional case, and 
not the normal case.  Alternately, the scenario can be changed to require a more realistic 
password policy to complete phase two.  For example, the change frequency for phase 1 
and phase 2 could be the same, e.g., six months or a year.  Password complexity could 
become the focus of the difference between phase 1 and phase 2, with “moderate” 
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implying a password not easily guessed, but potentially including a dictionary word.  A 
“complex” password would exclude dictionary words.  In the revised scenario, the 
student would be led to understand the risks of using dictionary words if the attacker has 
the means and the motive to obtain hashed password values. 
c. Improving Playability 
Playability issues were raised during user testing of the scenario.  Some 
players expressed concern that they were unsure exactly what they were supposed to be 
doing, and noted that it was not clear that there were two distinct phases in the scenario 
that had different goals.  Modifications to the scenario should be made to clarify these 
issues, but care should be taken to ensure that these modifications do not explicitly tell 
the player what to do.  In particular, the descriptions of the objectives as provided in the 
game are terse, and could be expanded. 
The game and scenario use relative terms for the options used in the 
password policy.  However, there is nothing in the scenario to give the user an indication 
of what the relative values mean.  The player might expect to find information about 
these options by bringing up the CyberCIEGE Encyclopedia pages for the component and 
zone tabs.  While this information is in the encyclopedia, the player has to follow a link 
from the page that initially comes up and it does not add a lot of insight.  Alternately a 
scenario-specific encyclopedia page could be displayed using a trigger.  This would 
permit the password policy options to be defined in terms specific to this scenario. 
Scenario development was performed by taking an existing scenario, 
removing unwanted components, and modifying and creating others to meet the goals of 
this project.  There may still be excess elements that do not affect the scenario, and an 
analysis should be performed to verify if this is indeed the case, and strip out any excess 
elements that are identified. 
2. Scenario Definition Tool 
Testing of the SDT revealed various issues with the tool that needed to be 
corrected, as described in Chapter III.  Some issues remain outstanding, in particular 
those related to the user interface.  An effort to bring the SDT into conformance with 
Microsoft’s user interface guidelines for Windows applications [Microsoft 2004] would 
improve overall usability. 
Better integration with the scenario definition language would also be beneficial.  
A sidebar that gives a description for the option currently selected, including a range of 
appropriate values, could help build scenarios more quickly.  An example of this 
behavior can be seen in the XMLSpy application from Altova, as shown in Figure 3 
[Altova 2005].  Here, the left side of the window shows details about the “xmlns” 
attribute of the “html” tag, including the type of data that is allowed, and in this case, the 
exact value required by the XHTML 1.0 standard.  One possible alternative to using a 
sidebar would be to provide a tool tip that displays additional information about a field 
when the user leaves the mouse pointing to it for a couple of seconds. 
 
Figure 3.   Altova XMLSpy gives information about the element currently being edited 
on the left side of the application window. [Altova 2005] 
 
The list of elements in the trees for the Reusable Sets Library and Current 
Scenario are both the same, yet do not appear in the same order.  For purposes of 
consistency they should both appear in the same order, preferably alphabetical order.  In 
addition, the SupportStaff element uses mixed alphabetical case to denote the separate 
words, whereas other elements have a space included in the names.  A space should be 
added to the SupportStaff element’s name for consistency. 
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The SDT should be enhanced so that commands that do not currently apply 
cannot be selected.  For example, the “Run” command should be disabled until after the 
scenario has been successfully built. 
Many applications, web browsers in particular, have popularized the tabbed 
interface used in the SDT.  Most of these tabbed interfaces provide a one-click method to 
close a tab, typically either a button at an end of the tab bar or on the tab itself.  The SDT 
currently lacks both.  The only way to close a tab is to right-click on the tab and choose 
“Close” from the pop-up menu, or choose “Close All” from the “File” menu, which 
closes all of the open tabs except for the “Scenario” tab.  A one-click method of closing a 
tab should be provided.  
3. CyberCIEGE Game 
Having been played by several people up to this point, the CyberCIEGE game 
itself has already had many problems worked out.  At present, there is just one area that 
ought to be reviewed more thoroughly.  Late in the development process for this scenario, 
a change was made that allows the user to deselect all of the password length options, 
indicating that the user has the option of not having a password.  It is not obvious to the 
player that this is a possibility, as none of the other sets of buttons, such as password 
change frequency or character complexity, give the player the option of having none 
selected.  Indeed, never requiring the password to be changed is an explicit option.  In 
order to improve consistency as well as better display all of the player’s options, a 
specific “no password” option should be displayed. 
B. CONCLUSION 
This thesis set out to develop a scenario that would provide the player with some 
insights into issues surrounding the development of password policies.  Such a scenario 
was developed.  Comments from the testers who played the scenario indicate that it was 
mostly successful in providing this, though additional refinement, as outlined in the 
previous section, would be helpful. 
The secondary goal of this thesis was to perform testing of the Scenario 
Development Tool.  This testing contributed to improvements in the functionality and 
usability of the tool, through the submission of bug reports as well as suggestions for 
improvements.  Further refinement should further increase the value of the tool. 
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As computer security issues enter the public consciousness, the need for tools to 
educate people about them will continue to grow.  It is hoped that this research will help 
to fill one small piece of that need. 
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APPENDIX A. SCENARIO SOURCE CODE LISTING 
The following is the code listing for the scenario as played by the student testers.  
It is presented in the form of the Scenario Definition File generated by the SDT and used 




SDFid: TomsHiLo.CSM 8/2/05 9 55 AM :end 
Organization: 
 Name: Tom's Tools :end 
 Title: Hi/Low Password Settings :end 
 StartMonth: 4 :end 
 StartDay: 10 :end 
 StartHour: 8 :end 
 StartMinute: 0 :end 
 StartMoney: 10000 :end 
 Budget: 5000 :end 
 ProfitSharing: 10 :end 
 MainOfficeVersion: large :end 
 OffsiteOfficeVersion: small_office :end 
 WorkSpaceFile: workspacemft1.txt :end 
 Internet: true :end 
 InternetStatic: false :end 
 EndOnCompromise: false :end 
 EasyTraining: false :end 
 TutorialAttacks: false :end 
 QuitText: Giving up? :end 
:end //of Organization 
 
Site: 
 Name: Simple Office :end 
 Description: Tom's Tools building :end 
:end  //of Site 
 
Options: 
 UseScenarioCatalogItems: YES :end 
 NonServerDefaultPublicAccess: YES :end 
 NetworksEverywhere: YES :end 
 GuardCostsAtStartup: NO :end 
:end 
Camera: 
 ViewCenterX: 55 :end 
 ViewCenterY: 41 :end 
 ViewAmountZoom: 2 :end 
 ViewAmountAngle: 0 :end 
:end // of Camera 
 
AttackMasks: 
 Mask: 0 :end 
 Mask: 0 :end 
 Mask: 0 :end 
 Mask: 0 :end 
 Mask: 1 :end 
 Mask: 1 :end 
 Mask: 0 :end 
 Mask: 0 :end 
 Mask: 1 :end 
 Mask: 1 :end 
 Mask: 1 :end 
 Mask: 1 :end 
 Mask: 1 :end 
 Mask: 1 :end 
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 Mask: 0 :end 
 Mask: 1 :end 
 Mask: 0 :end 
 Mask: 0 :end 
 Mask: 0 :end 
 Mask: 0 :end 
 Mask: 0 :end 
:end // of attackMask 
Network: 
 Name: Lan1 :end 
 NetID: 2.4.7...0 :end 
:end //of Network 
 
Network: 
 Name: Lan2 :end 
 NetID: 0.0.0..0 :end 
:end //of Network 
 
Network: 
 Name: Lan3 :end 
 NetID: 0.0.0..0 :end 
:end //of Network 
 
Network: 
 Name: HO :end 
 NetID: 3.0.0..0 :end 
:end //of Network 
 
Network: 
 Name: HO1 :end 
 NetID: 4.0.0..0 :end 
:end //of Network 
 
Network: 
 Name: HO2 :end 
 NetID: 4.0.0..0 :end 
:end //of Network 
 
Department: 
 Name: Employees :end 
:end //of Department 
 
Zone: 
 Name: Entire Office :end 
 Description:  :end 
 Site: Simple Office :end 
 Art: ..\testing\art\defaultoffice.tga :end 
 Static: false :end 
 // Start Default Component Settings 
  HoldsUserAsset: true :end 
  ProtectWithACL: false :end 
  WriteDownPasswords: true :end 
  LockorLogoff: false :end 
  PasswordLength: short :end 
  PasswordCharacterSet: any :end 
  PasswordChangeFrequency: never :end 
  NoEmailAttachmentExecute: true :end 
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  NoExternalSoftware: true :end 
  NoUseOfModems: false :end 
  NoWebMail: false :end 
  NoMediaLeaveZone: false :end 
  ApplyPatches: false :end 
  LeaveMachinesOn: false :end 
  NoPhysicalModifications: false :end 
  UserBackup: false :end 
 // End Default Component Settings 
 Receptionist: false :end 
 GuardAtDoor: false :end 
 PatrollingGuard: false :end 
 ProhibitMedia: false :end 
 ProhibitPhoneDevices: false :end 
 ExpensivePerimeterAlarms: false :end 
 ModeratePerimeterAlarms: false :end 
 Re-enforcedWalls: false :end 
 SurveillanceCameras: false :end 
 PermitEscortedVisitors: false :end 
 VisualPeopleInspection: false :end 
 XrayPackages: false :end 
 KeyLockOnDoor: false :end 
 CipherLockOnDoor: false :end 
 ExpensiveIrisScanner: false :end 
 ModerateIrisScanner: false :end 
 Badges: false :end 
 Order: 0 :end 
 PermittedUsers: *.Public :end 
 ULC:  19 51 :end 
 LRC:  68 25 :end 
 DoorGuardFacing: NORTH :end 
:end //of Zone 
 
Zone: 
 Name: Walled Office South East :end 
 Description:  :end 
 Site: Simple Office :end 
 Art: ..\testing\art\LowRightZone.tga :end 
 Static: false :end 
 // Start Default Component Settings 
  HoldsUserAsset: true :end 
  ProtectWithACL: false :end 
  WriteDownPasswords: true :end 
  LockorLogoff: false :end 
  PasswordLength: short :end 
  PasswordCharacterSet: any :end 
  PasswordChangeFrequency: never :end 
  NoEmailAttachmentExecute: true :end 
  NoExternalSoftware: true :end 
  NoUseOfModems: false :end 
  NoWebMail: false :end 
  NoMediaLeaveZone: false :end 
  ApplyPatches: false :end 
  LeaveMachinesOn: false :end 
  NoPhysicalModifications: false :end 
  UserBackup: false :end 
 // End Default Component Settings 
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 Receptionist: false :end 
 GuardAtDoor: false :end 
 PatrollingGuard: false :end 
 ProhibitMedia: false :end 
 ProhibitPhoneDevices: false :end 
 ExpensivePerimeterAlarms: true :end 
 ModeratePerimeterAlarms: false :end 
 Re-enforcedWalls: true :end 
 SurveillanceCameras: false :end 
 PermitEscortedVisitors: false :end 
 VisualPeopleInspection: false :end 
 XrayPackages: false :end 
 KeyLockOnDoor: false :end 
 CipherLockOnDoor: false :end 
 ExpensiveIrisScanner: false :end 
 ModerateIrisScanner: false :end 
 Badges: false :end 
 Order: 0 :end 
 PermittedUsers: *.Management :end 
 ULC:  49 38 :end 
 LRC:  68 26 :end 
 DoorGuardFacing: NORTH :end 
:end //of Zone 
 
Zone: 
 Name: Offsite :end 
 Description:  :end 
 Site: Simple Office :end 
 Art: ..\testing\art\nothing.tga :end 
 Static: true :end 
 // Start Default Component Settings 
  HoldsUserAsset: true :end 
  ProtectWithACL: true :end 
  WriteDownPasswords: false :end 
  LockorLogoff: true :end 
  PasswordLength: medium :end 
  PasswordCharacterSet: any :end 
  PasswordChangeFrequency: never :end 
  NoEmailAttachmentExecute: false :end 
  NoExternalSoftware: false :end 
  NoUseOfModems: false :end 
  NoWebMail: true :end 
  NoMediaLeaveZone: false :end 
  ApplyPatches: true :end 
  LeaveMachinesOn: false :end 
  NoPhysicalModifications: true :end 
  UserBackup: false :end 
 // End Default Component Settings 
 Receptionist: true :end 
 GuardAtDoor: false :end 
 PatrollingGuard: false :end 
 ProhibitMedia: false :end 
 ProhibitPhoneDevices: false :end 
 ExpensivePerimeterAlarms: true :end 
 ModeratePerimeterAlarms: false :end 
 Re-enforcedWalls: true :end 
 SurveillanceCameras: true :end 
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 PermitEscortedVisitors: false :end 
 VisualPeopleInspection: false :end 
 XrayPackages: false :end 
 KeyLockOnDoor: true :end 
 CipherLockOnDoor: true :end 
 ExpensiveIrisScanner: false :end 
 ModerateIrisScanner: true :end 
 Badges: true :end 
 Order: 0 :end 
 ULC:  94 29 :end 
 LRC:  106 21 :end 
 DoorGuardFacing: NORTH :end 
:end //of Zone 
 
Secrecy: 
 Name: Non-sensitive Data :end 
 Description: Non-sensitive information with no protection 
requirements beyond the discretionary access controls. :end 
 Level: 1 :end 
 SecrecyValue: 0 :end 
 AttackerValue: 0 :end 
 InitialBackGroundCheck: None :end 
:end //of Secrecy 
 
Secrecy: 
 Name: Business Confidential :end 
 Description:  :end 
 Level: 4 :end 
 Category: 5 :end 
 SecrecyValue: 10000 :end 
 AttackerValue: 0 :end 
 InitialBackGroundCheck: High :end 
:end //of Secrecy 
 
DACGroups: 
 Group: Management :end 
 InitialBackGroundCheck: High :end 
 Group: Staff :end 
 InitialBackGroundCheck: High :end 
 Group: Public :end 
 InitialBackGroundCheck: None :end 
:end // of DAC Groups 
Asset: 
 Name: Web Page :end 
 Description: Tom's Tools Web Page :end 
 IsInstantiated: true :end 
 HasDAC: true :end 
 DOSMotive: 0 :end 
 AvailabilityPenalty: 0 :end 
 AccessList: 
  *.Public YNNN  *.Public YNNN 
 :end 
 CostList: 
  Access: *.Public :end 
  AccessMode: NYNN :end 
  Cost: 0 :end 




  Access: *.Public :end 
  AccessMode: NYNN :end 
  Cost: 0 :end 
  AttackerMotive: 0 :end 
 :end 
:end //of Asset 
 
Asset: 
 Name: Basic Research :end 
 Description: Public info on the web :end 
 IsInstantiated: false :end 
 HasDAC: true :end 
 Secrecy: Non-sensitive Data :end 
 DOSMotive: 0 :end 
 AvailabilityPenalty: 0 :end 
 AccessList: 
  *.Management YYYY  *.Staff YYYY 
 :end 
 CostList: 
  Access: *.Management :end 
  AccessMode: NNNN :end 
  Cost: 0 :end 
  AttackerMotive: 0 :end 
 :end 
:end //of Asset 
 
Asset: 
 Name: Inventory :end 
 Description: Current store inventory :end 
 IsInstantiated: true :end 
 HasDAC: true :end 
 Secrecy: Business Confidential :end 
 DOSMotive: 0 :end 
 AvailabilityPenalty: 0 :end 
 AccessList: 
  *.Management YYNN 
 :end 
 CostList: 
  Access: *.Management :end 
  AccessMode: NNNN :end 
  Cost: 0 :end 
  AttackerMotive: 0 :end 
 :end 
:end //of Asset 
 
Asset: 
 Name: Customer Emails :end 
 Description: Email inqueries from customers. :end 
 IsInstantiated: true :end 
 HasDAC: true :end 
 Secrecy: Business Confidential :end 
 DOSMotive: 0 :end 
 AvailabilityPenalty: 0 :end 
 AccessList: 




  Access: *.Management :end 
  AccessMode: NNNN :end 
  Cost: 0 :end 
  AttackerMotive: 0 :end 
 :end 
:end //of Asset 
 
AssetGoal: 
 Name: Read Inventory :end 
 Description: Read access to the Inventory. :end 
 Shared: false :end 
 Asset: 
  Name: Inventory :end 
  filtered: false :end 
  AccessMode: YXXX :end 
 :end 
 AvailabilityCostPenalty: 0 :end 
:end //of AssetGoal 
 
AssetGoal: 
 Name: Write Inventory :end 
 Description: Write access to the Inventory. :end 
 Shared: false :end 
 Asset: 
  Name: Web Page :end 
  filtered: false :end 
  AccessMode: XYXX :end 
 :end 
 AvailabilityCostPenalty: 0 :end 
:end //of AssetGoal 
 
AssetGoal: 
 Name: Access E-Mail :end 
 Description: Read and write customer emails. :end 
 Shared: true :end 
 Asset: 
  Name: Customer Emails :end 
  filtered: false :end 
  AccessMode: YYXX :end 
 :end 
 SoftwareType: EMAIL CLIENT :end 
 AvailabilityCostPenalty: 0 :end 
:end //of AssetGoal 
 
User: 
 Name: Tom :end 
 Dept:  Employees :end 
 SecrecyClearance:  Business Confidential :end 
 DACGroups: 
  Management :end 
  Staff :end 
 :end 
 DefaultDAC: Management :end 
 AssetGoal: 
  AssetGoalName: Write Inventory :end 
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  TargetUsage: 50 :end 
  Happiness: 15 :end 
  Productivity: 25 :end 
 :end 
 AssetGoal: 
  AssetGoalName: Read Inventory :end 
  TargetUsage: 50 :end 
  Happiness: 25 :end 
  Productivity: 25 :end 
 :end 
 AssetGoal: 
  AssetGoalName: Access E-Mail :end 
  TargetUsage: 50 :end 
  Happiness: 10 :end 
  Productivity: 10 :end 
 :end 
 Trustworthiness:  100 :end 
 InitialTraining: 70 :end 
 Happiness: 50 :end 
 Productivity: 50 :end 
 HISupportSkill: 10 :end 
 PosIndex: 4 :end 
 Cost: 1 :end 
 Gender: male :end 
 UserDescription: Tom is the owner of Tom's Tools. :end 
:end //of User 
 
User: 
 Name: Jane :end 
 Dept:  Employees :end 
 SecrecyClearance:  Business Confidential :end 
 DACGroups: 
  Staff :end 
 :end 
 DefaultDAC: Staff :end 
 AssetGoal: 
  AssetGoalName: Read Inventory :end 
  TargetUsage: 50 :end 
  Happiness: 25 :end 
  Productivity: 25 :end 
 :end 
 AssetGoal: 
  AssetGoalName: Access E-Mail :end 
  TargetUsage: 50 :end 
  Happiness: 25 :end 
  Productivity: 50 :end 
 :end 
 Trustworthiness:  75 :end 
 InitialTraining: 70 :end 
 Happiness: 50 :end 
 Productivity: 50 :end 
 HISupportSkill: 10 :end 
 PosIndex: 0 :end 
 Cost: 1 :end 
 Gender: female :end 
 UserDescription: Jane handles most of the customer service and 
sales tasks for Tom's Tools. :end 
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:end //of User 
 
User: //SupportStaff 
 Name: Steve :end 
 Dept:  Tech :end 
 HWSupportSkill: 90 :end 
 SWSupportSkill: 90 :end 
 HISupportSkill: 90 :end 
 Trustworthiness:  90 :end 
 InitialTraining: 95 :end 
 Happiness: 90 :end 
 Productivity: 90 :end 
 Skill: 95 :end 
 PosIndex: 1 :end 
 Cost: 1000 :end 
 Gender: Male :end 
 UserDescription: Steve writes operating systems in his free time. 
:end 
:end //of SupportStaff 
 
User: //SupportStaff 
 Name: Boris :end 
 Dept:  Security :end 
 HWSupportSkill: 10 :end 
 SWSupportSkill: 10 :end 
 HISupportSkill: 90 :end 
 Trustworthiness:  90 :end 
 InitialTraining: 95 :end 
 Happiness: 90 :end 
 Productivity: 90 :end 
 Skill: 95 :end 
 PosIndex: 2 :end 
 Cost: 1000 :end 
 Gender: Male :end 
 UserDescription: Boris bench presses small jets. :end 
:end //of SupportStaff 
 
Workspace: 





















 PosIndex: 5 :end 




 PosIndex: 14 :end 
:end 
 
Component: //start of the physical component section. 
 Name: Web Server :end 
 IsTemplate: false :end 
 Description: Web server :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Targo Server :end 
 Cost: 2000 :end 
 Resale: 600 :end 
 Maintenance: 20 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 Static: true :end 
 OS: Populos V9 Server :end 
 Software: Populos Web Slave :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: true :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: true :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: true :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 EnforcePasswordPolicy: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: Loose :end 
 EmailSettings: Loose :end 
 UpdatePatches: AsReleased :end 
 ManagedAntivirus: false :end 
 User:  :end 
 PosIndex: 14 :end 
 Assets: Web Page :end 
 Assets: Customer Emails :end 
 AccessListLocal: *.Public :end 
 AccessListRemote: *.Public :end 
 UninterruptiblePower: false :end 
 CM: Weak :end 
 //NetworkConnections: 
 Network: 
  Name: HO1 :end 
 :end //of network description 
 //end of NetworkConnections: 
 ComponentProceduralSettings: 
  HoldsUserAsset: true :end 
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  ProtectWithACL: false :end 
  WriteDownPasswords: false :end 
  LockorLogoff: true :end 
  PasswordLength: long :end 
  PasswordCharacterSet: complex :end 
  PasswordChangeFrequency: two :end 
  NoEmailAttachmentExecute: true :end 
  NoExternalSoftware: true :end 
  NoUseOfModems: true :end 
  NoWebMail: true :end 
  NoMediaLeaveZone: true :end 
  ApplyPatches: true :end 
  LeaveMachinesOn: true :end 
  NoPhysicalModifications: true :end 
  UserBackup: false :end 
 :end //of ComponentProceduralSettings 
:end //of physical component Section 
 
Component: //start of the physical component section. 
 Name: BitFlipper Router HO :end 
 IsTemplate: false :end 
 Description: Simple Router :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Bit Flipper :end 
 Cost: 2000 :end 
 Resale: 600 :end 
 Maintenance: 20 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 Static: true :end 
 OS: FlipOS :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 EnforcePasswordPolicy: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: Loose :end 
 EmailSettings: Loose :end 
 UpdatePatches: AsReleased :end 
 ManagedAntivirus: false :end 
 User:  :end 
 PosIndex: 14 :end 
 UninterruptiblePower: false :end 
 CM: Weak :end 
 //NetworkConnections: 
 Network: 
  Name: HO1 :end 
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 :end //of network description 
 //end of NetworkConnections: 
 Network: 
  Name: Internet :end 
 :end //of network description 
 //end of NetworkConnections: 
:end //of physical component Section 
 
Component: //start of the physical component section. 
 Name: Intranet Server :end 
 IsTemplate: false :end 
 Description: Intranet server :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Targo Server :end 
 Cost: 2000 :end 
 Resale: 600 :end 
 Maintenance: 20 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 Static: false :end 
 OS: Populos V9 Server :end 
 Software: Populos Web Slave :end 
 Software: Extortos :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: true :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: true :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: true :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 EnforcePasswordPolicy: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: Loose :end 
 EmailSettings: Loose :end 
 UpdatePatches: AsReleased :end 
 ManagedAntivirus: false :end 
 User:  :end 
 PosIndex: 5 :end 
 Assets: Inventory :end 
 AccessListLocal: *.Management :end 
 AccessListRemote: *.Management :end 
 AccessListRemote: *.Staff :end 
 UninterruptiblePower: false :end 
 CM: Weak :end 
 //NetworkConnections: 
 Network: 
  Name: Lan1 :end 
 :end //of network description 
 //end of NetworkConnections: 
 ComponentProceduralSettings: 
  HoldsUserAsset: true :end 
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  ProtectWithACL: false :end 
  WriteDownPasswords: false :end 
  LockorLogoff: true :end 
  PasswordLength: long :end 
  PasswordCharacterSet: complex :end 
  PasswordChangeFrequency: two :end 
  NoEmailAttachmentExecute: true :end 
  NoExternalSoftware: true :end 
  NoUseOfModems: true :end 
  NoWebMail: true :end 
  NoMediaLeaveZone: true :end 
  ApplyPatches: true :end 
  LeaveMachinesOn: true :end 
  NoPhysicalModifications: true :end 
  UserBackup: false :end 
 :end //of ComponentProceduralSettings 
:end //of physical component Section 
 
Component: //start of the physical component section. 
 Name: BitFlipper Router Office :end 
 IsTemplate: false :end 
 Description: Office router :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Bit Flipper :end 
 Cost: 2000 :end 
 Resale: 600 :end 
 Maintenance: 20 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 Static: true :end 
 OS: FlipOS :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 EnforcePasswordPolicy: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: Loose :end 
 EmailSettings: Loose :end 
 UpdatePatches: AsReleased :end 
 ManagedAntivirus: false :end 
 User:  :end 
 PosIndex: 5 :end 
 UninterruptiblePower: false :end 
 CM: Weak :end 
 //NetworkConnections: 
 Network: 
  Name: Lan1 :end 
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 :end //of network description 
 //end of NetworkConnections: 
 Network: 
  Name: Internet :end 
 :end //of network description 
 //end of NetworkConnections: 
:end //of physical component Section 
 
Component: //start of the physical component section. 
 Name: Toms Targo :end 
 IsTemplate: false :end 
 Description: Targo Worksaver computer, for use by Tom. :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Targo Worksaver :end 
 Cost: 2000 :end 
 Resale: 600 :end 
 Maintenance: 20 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 Static: false :end 
 OS: Populos V9 Desktop :end 
 Software: WordSmyth :end 
 Software: Internet Contemplator :end 
 Software: Extortos :end 
 Software: Euphoria :end 
 Software: Cell Life :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: true :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: true :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: true :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: true :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 EnforcePasswordPolicy: true :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: Normal :end 
 EmailSettings: Normal :end 
 UpdatePatches: AsReleased :end 
 ManagedAntivirus: false :end 
 User: Tom :end 
 PosIndex: 4 :end 
 AccessListLocal: Tom :end 
 UninterruptiblePower: false :end 
 CM: Weak :end 
 //NetworkConnections: 
 Network: 
  Name: Lan1 :end 
 :end //of network description 
 //end of NetworkConnections: 
 ComponentProceduralSettings: 
  HoldsUserAsset: true :end 
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  ProtectWithACL: false :end 
  WriteDownPasswords: true :end 
  LockorLogoff: false :end 
  PasswordLength: short :end 
  PasswordCharacterSet: any :end 
  PasswordChangeFrequency: never :end 
  NoEmailAttachmentExecute: true :end 
  NoExternalSoftware: true :end 
  NoUseOfModems: false :end 
  NoWebMail: false :end 
  NoMediaLeaveZone: false :end 
  ApplyPatches: false :end 
  LeaveMachinesOn: false :end 
  NoPhysicalModifications: false :end 
  UserBackup: false :end 
 :end //of ComponentProceduralSettings 
:end //of physical component Section 
 
Component: //start of the physical component section. 
 Name: Janes Targo :end 
 IsTemplate: false :end 
 Description: Targo Worksaver computer, for use by Jane. :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Targo Worksaver :end 
 Cost: 2000 :end 
 Resale: 600 :end 
 Maintenance: 20 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 Static: false :end 
 OS: Populos V9 Desktop :end 
 Software: WordSmyth :end 
 Software: Internet Contemplator :end 
 Software: Extortos :end 
 Software: Euphoria :end 
 Software: Cell Life :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: true :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: true :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: true :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: true :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 EnforcePasswordPolicy: true :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: Normal :end 
 EmailSettings: Normal :end 
 UpdatePatches: AsReleased :end 
 ManagedAntivirus: false :end 
 User: Jane :end 
 PosIndex: 0 :end 
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 AccessListLocal: Jane :end 
 UninterruptiblePower: false :end 
 CM: Weak :end 
 //NetworkConnections: 
 Network: 
  Name: Lan1 :end 
 :end //of network description 
 //end of NetworkConnections: 
 ComponentProceduralSettings: 
  HoldsUserAsset: true :end 
  ProtectWithACL: false :end 
  WriteDownPasswords: true :end 
  LockorLogoff: false :end 
  PasswordLength: short :end 
  PasswordCharacterSet: any :end 
  PasswordChangeFrequency: never :end 
  NoEmailAttachmentExecute: true :end 
  NoExternalSoftware: true :end 
  NoUseOfModems: false :end 
  NoWebMail: false :end 
  NoMediaLeaveZone: false :end 
  ApplyPatches: false :end 
  LeaveMachinesOn: false :end 
  NoPhysicalModifications: false :end 
  UserBackup: false :end 
 :end //of ComponentProceduralSettings 
:end //of physical component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Blato Desktop Select :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: Packed with applications, memory and disk :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Blato Desktop Select :end 
 Cost: 1700 :end 
 Resale: 200 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Populos V9 Desktop :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: NORMAL :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
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 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Targo Worksaver :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: Full suite of productivity software, adequate memory 
and dis. :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Targo Worksaver :end 
 Cost: 1700 :end 
 Resale: 200 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Populos V9 Desktop :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Trusted Targo Worksaver :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: Similar to the Targo Worksaver, but includes the 
Trusted Populos OS. :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Trusted Targo Worksaver :end 
 Cost: 2500 :end 
 Resale: 200 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Trusted Populos Desktop :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
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 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: The Thin Man :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: A thin client intended to work with either Gossamer 
products or Populos Terminal Servers. :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: The Thin Man :end 
 Cost: 900 :end 
 Resale: 100 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Populos Embedded V5 :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Green Net Client :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: A thin client intended to work with Gossamer 
products. Intended use is to connect to multiple networks of different 
sensitivity levels :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Green Net Client :end 
 Cost: 3000 :end 
 Resale: 1000 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
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 OS: Secure Shade Desktop :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Lunitos AFOS :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: Sleek colorful desktop machine with adequate memory 
and disk :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Lunitos AFOS :end 
 Cost: 2300 :end 
 Resale: 300 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Lunitos Desktop :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Greenshade Client :end 
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 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: High assurance client workstation :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Blato Desktop Select :end 
 Cost: 4200 :end 
 Resale: 800 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Secure Shade Desktop :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Targo Server :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: Full featured server with the worlds most popular 
operating system. :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Targo Server :end 
 Cost: 15000 :end 
 Resale: 5000 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Populos V9 Server :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
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 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Blato Server :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: Full featured server with the worlds most popular 
operating system. :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Blato Server :end 
 Cost: 15000 :end 
 Resale: 5000 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Populos V9 Server :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Twist Off Server :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: Server class machine with the Jar Lid Server O/S 
:end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Twist Off Server :end 
 Cost: 10000 :end 
 Resale: 5000 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Jar Lid Server :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
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 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Green Shade Server :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: Server class machine with the Secure Shade Server 
high assurance operating system :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Green Shade Server :end 
 Cost: 80000 :end 
 Resale: 20000 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Secure Shade Server :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Mail Appliance :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: Simple Email Server. :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Targo Server :end 
 Cost: 5000 :end 
 Resale: 2000 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
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 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Jar Lid Server :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Populos Letter Pusher :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: Email Server that rules. :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Blato Server :end 
 Cost: 20000 :end 
 Resale: 8000 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Populos V9 Server :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Web Appliance :end 
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 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: Simple web server :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Twist Off Server :end 
 Cost: 1500 :end 
 Resale: 2000 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Jar Lid Server :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Populos Internet Slave :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: Web Server that rules the web. :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Blato Server :end 
 Cost: 10000 :end 
 Resale: 2000 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Populos V9 Server :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
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 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: MergerTech DeskProp :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: Priner :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: MergerTech DeskProp :end 
 Cost: 200 :end 
 Resale: 2 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: MergerTech SOS :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Bit Flipper :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: High performance router :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Bit Flipper :end 
 Cost: 150 :end 
 Resale: 60 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: FlipOS :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
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 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Bit Flipper VPN :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: VPN Gateway -- another Bit Flipper product :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Bit Flipper VPN :end 
 Cost: 200 :end 
 Resale: 100 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: FlipOS :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Bent Line VPN :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: VPN Gateway Evaluated to EAL4+ :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Bent Line VPN :end 
 Cost: 1500 :end 
 Resale: 2000 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Populos V8 Server :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
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 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Green Shade VPN :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: VPN Gateway On a Green Shade Core :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Green Shade VPN :end 
 Cost: 1500 :end 
 Resale: 500 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Green Shade Core :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Crack This! :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: Best Selling VPN Gateway :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Crack This! :end 
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 Cost: 1500 :end 
 Resale: 500 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Populos V9 Server :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Bit Flipper Switch :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: Best Selling VPN Gateway :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Bit Flipper Switch :end 
 Cost: 500 :end 
 Resale: 200 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: FlipOS :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
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Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Swenthabit :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: Vanilla LAN switch :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Swenthabit :end 
 Cost: 500 :end 
 Resale: 200 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: FlipOS :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Five Inches of Asbestos :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: Best selling firewall :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Five Inches of Asbestos :end 
 Cost: 900 :end 
 Resale: 200 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Populos V9 Desktop :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
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 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Bit Flipper Border :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: Full featured firewall :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Bit Flipper Border :end 
 Cost: 200 :end 
 Resale: 100 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Populos V9 Desktop :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Wire Stuff :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: High quality hub with high reliability :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Wire Stuff :end 
 Cost: 150 :end 
 Resale: 100 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Populos V9 Desktop :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
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 HW: Paint It Black :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Box with Wires :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: General purpose hub :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Box with Wires :end 
 Cost: 90 :end 
 Resale: 100 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Populos V9 Desktop :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Paint It Black :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: Link Encryptor handles most wide area network 
protocols :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 Cost: 290 :end 
 Resale: 100 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
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 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Populos V9 Desktop :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
 Name: Enigma2000 :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: Link Encryptor handles most wide area network 
protocols :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: Enigma2000 :end 
 Cost: 290 :end 
 Resale: 100 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Populos V9 Desktop :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 
:end //of catalog component Section 
 
Component: //start of the catalog component section. 
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 Name: NightShade :end 
 IsTemplate: true :end 
 Description: Link Encryptor handles most wide area network 
protocols :end 
 AssetProtection: false :end 
 HW: NightShade :end 
 Cost: 290 :end 
 Resale: 100 :end 
 Maintenance: 100 :end 
 Availability: 99 :end 
 OS: Populos V9 Desktop :end 
 RemoteAuthentication: false :end 
 AcceptPKICerts: false :end 
 UseOneTimePasswordToken: false :end 
 UseBiometrics: false :end 
 UseTokenPKICerts: false :end 
 UseClientPKICerts: false :end 
 VPNClient: false :end 
 ScanEmailAttachments: false :end 
 StripEmailAttachments: false :end 
 AutomaticLockLogout: false :end 
 SelfAdminister: false :end 
 SelfAdministerMAC: false :end 
 AdministerSoftwareControl: false :end 
 BlockRemovableMedia: false :end 
 BlockLocalStorage: false :end 
 BrowserSettings: LOOSE :end 
 EmailSettings: LOOSE :end 
 UpdatePatches: NONE :end 
 UpdateAntivirus: NONE :end 




  Tagname: MinCash0 :end 
  ConditionClass: MinCashOnHand :end 
  Parameter: 0 :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: Time36Hours :end 
  ConditionClass: TimeCondition :end 
  Parameter: 36 :end 
  Parameter: 1 :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: time0days :end 
  ConditionClass: TimeCondition :end 
  Parameter: 0 :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: time30days :end 
  ConditionClass: TimeCondition :end 
  Parameter: 720 :end 
  Parameter: 1 :end 
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:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: time2days :end 
  ConditionClass: TimeCondition :end 
  Parameter: 48 :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: time1day :end 
  ConditionClass: TimeCondition :end 
  Parameter: 24 :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: time3hours :end 
  ConditionClass: TimeCondition :end 
  Parameter: 3 :end 
  Parameter: 1 :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: time2hours :end 
  ConditionClass: TimeCondition :end 
  Parameter: 2 :end 
  Parameter: 1 :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: time4hours :end 
  ConditionClass: TimeCondition :end 
  Parameter: 4 :end 
  Parameter: 1 :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: time8hours :end 
  ConditionClass: TimeCondition :end 
  Parameter: 8 :end 
  Parameter: 1 :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: time7hours :end 
  ConditionClass: TimeCondition :end 
  Parameter: 7 :end 
  Parameter: 1 :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: time12hours :end 
  ConditionClass: TimeCondition :end 
  Parameter: 12 :end 
  Parameter: 1 :end 




  Tagname: time1hour :end 
  ConditionClass: TimeCondition :end 
  Parameter: 1 :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: time1hourPhase :end 
  ConditionClass: TimeCondition :end 
  Parameter: 1 :end 
  Parameter: 1 :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: time5hours :end 
  ConditionClass: TimeCondition :end 
  Parameter: 5 :end 
  Parameter: 1 :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: time6hours :end 
  ConditionClass: TimeCondition :end 
  Parameter: 6 :end 
  Parameter: 1 :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: time3days :end 
  ConditionClass: TimeCondition :end 
  Parameter: 72 :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: TomShortPass :end 
  ConditionClass: AssignedComputerHas :end 
  ConditionText: Tom :end 
  SecondConditionText:  PasswordLength:Short :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: TomAnyCharPass :end 
  ConditionClass: AssignedComputerHas :end 
  ConditionText: Tom :end 
  SecondConditionText:  PasswordCharacterSet:Any :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: TomNeverChgPass :end 
  ConditionClass: AssignedComputerHas :end 
  ConditionText: Tom :end 
  SecondConditionText:  PasswordChangeFrequency:never :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: JaneNeverChgPass :end 
  ConditionClass: AssignedComputerHas :end 
  ConditionText: Jane :end 
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  SecondConditionText:  PasswordChangeFrequency:never :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: JaneAnyCharPass :end 
  ConditionClass: AssignedComputerHas :end 
  ConditionText: Jane :end 
  SecondConditionText:  PasswordCharacterSet:Any :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: JaneShortPass :end 
  ConditionClass: AssignedComputerHas :end 
  ConditionText: Jane :end 
  SecondConditionText:  PasswordLength:Short :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: JaneLongPass :end 
  ConditionClass: AssignedComputerHas :end 
  ConditionText: Jane :end 
  SecondConditionText:  PasswordLength:Long :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: JaneComplexCharPass :end 
  ConditionClass: AssignedComputerHas :end 
  ConditionText: Jane :end 
  SecondConditionText:  PasswordCharacterSet:Complex :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: Jane2MChgPass :end 
  ConditionClass: AssignedComputerHas :end 
  ConditionText: Jane :end 
  SecondConditionText:  PasswordChangeFrequency:two :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: JaneWritePass :end 
  ConditionClass: AssignedComputerHas :end 
  ConditionText: Jane :end 
  SecondConditionText:  WriteDownPassword: :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: TomWritePass :end 
  ConditionClass: AssignedComputerHas :end 
  ConditionText: Tom :end 
  SecondConditionText:  WriteDownPassword: :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: Tom2MChgPass :end 
  ConditionClass: AssignedComputerHas :end 
  ConditionText: Tom :end 
  SecondConditionText:  PasswordChangeFrequency:two :end 
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:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: TomCompexCharPass :end 
  ConditionClass: AssignedComputerHas :end 
  ConditionText: Tom :end 
  SecondConditionText:  PasswordCharacterSet:Complex :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: Phase1Done :end 
  ConditionClass: PhaseCompleted :end 
  ConditionText: First :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: Phase2Done :end 
  ConditionClass: PhaseCompleted :end 
  ConditionText: Second :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: MedPWSet :end 
  ConditionClass: ObjectiveCompleted :end 
  ConditionText: MedPWSettings :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: HighPWSet :end 
  ConditionClass: ObjectiveCompleted :end 
  ConditionText: HighPWSettings :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: HighPWAccept :end 
  ConditionClass: ObjectiveCompleted :end 
  ConditionText: HighPWUsersAccept :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: TomTrain75 :end 
  ConditionClass: UserTraining :end 
  ConditionText: Tom :end 
  Parameter: 75 :end 
  Parameter: 100 :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: JaneTrain75 :end 
  ConditionClass: UserTraining :end 
  ConditionText: Jane :end 
  Parameter: 75 :end 
  Parameter: 100 :end 
:end //of Condition 
 
 Condition: 
  Tagname: TomLongPass :end 
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  ConditionClass: AssignedComputerHas :end 
  ConditionText: Tom :end 
  SecondConditionText:  PasswordLength:Long :end 





  TriggerName: JaneLowPassHack :end 
  TriggerClass: CashTrigger :end 
  FrequencyInDays: .25 :end 
  FixedDelay: 0 :end 
  RandomDelay: .25 :end 
  RunsWhilePaused: false :end 
  ConditionList: time1hour AND JaneShortPass AND 
JaneNeverChgPass AND JaneAnyCharPass AND_NOT Phase1Done :end 
  TriggerText: Jane's password settings are too low; an 
Internet hacker was able to break into her computer and read the 
Inventory. Cost $1000. :end 
  Parameter: -1000 :end 
 :end //of Trigger 
 
 Trigger: 
  TriggerName: goPhase2 :end 
  TriggerClass: SetPhase :end 
  FrequencyInDays: 999 :end 
  FixedDelay: 0 :end 
  RandomDelay: 0 :end 
  RunsWhilePaused: false :end 
  ConditionList: MedPWSet :end 
  TriggerText: Second :end 
  SecondTriggerText: You've started to notice a pattern to 
the break-in attempts. The attacks are coming from an address range 
that can be traced to Hammer House, the more established hardware store 
in town. You suspect that they've hired hackers to try and break in and 
modify your Inventory. You see from your server logs that their attack 
method seems to be to brute force attack the passwords on Tom and 
Jane's computers. Keep them out long enough to gather enough evidence 
to use against them in court. :end 
 :end //of Trigger 
 
 Trigger: 
  TriggerName: goPhase2Cash :end 
  TriggerClass: CashTrigger :end 
  FrequencyInDays: 999 :end 
  FixedDelay: 0 :end 
  RandomDelay: 0 :end 
  RunsWhilePaused: false :end 
  ConditionList: MedPWSet :end 
  Parameter: 30000 :end 
 :end //of Trigger 
 
 Trigger: 
  TriggerName: MedPWObjCompleted :end 
  TriggerClass: SetObjectiveStatus :end 
  FrequencyInDays: 999 :end 
  FixedDelay: 0 :end 
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  RandomDelay: 0 :end 
  RunsWhilePaused: false :end 
  ConditionList: NOT ((JaneShortPass AND JaneNeverChgPass AND 
JaneAnyCharPass) OR (JaneLongPass AND JaneComplexCharPass AND 
Jane2MChgPass) OR (TomShortPass AND (TomNeverChgPass OR 
TomAnyCharPass)) OR (TomLongPass AND TomCompexCharPass AND 
Tom2MChgPass)) :end 
  TriggerText: MedPWSettings :end 
  Parameter: 1 :end 
 :end //of Trigger 
 
 Trigger: 
  TriggerName: HihgPWObjCompleted :end 
  TriggerClass: SetObjectiveStatus :end 
  FrequencyInDays: 999 :end 
  FixedDelay: 0 :end 
  RandomDelay: 0 :end 
  RunsWhilePaused: false :end 
  ConditionList: Phase1Done AND JaneLongPass AND 
JaneComplexCharPass AND Jane2MChgPass AND Tom2MChgPass AND 
TomCompexCharPass AND TomLongPass AND TomWritePass AND JaneWritePass 
:end 
  TriggerText: HighPWSettings :end 
  Parameter: 1 :end 
 :end //of Trigger 
 
 Trigger: 
  TriggerName: UsersAcceptHighPWObjCompleted :end 
  TriggerClass: SetObjectiveStatus :end 
  FrequencyInDays: 999 :end 
  FixedDelay: 0 :end 
  RandomDelay: 0 :end 
  RunsWhilePaused: false :end 
  ConditionList: TomTrain75 AND JaneTrain75 :end 
  TriggerText: HighPWUsersAccept :end 
  Parameter: 1 :end 
 :end //of Trigger 
 
 Trigger: 
  TriggerName: LoseBroke :end 
  TriggerClass: LoseTrigger :end 
  FrequencyInDays: 999 :end 
  FixedDelay: 0 :end 
  RandomDelay: 0 :end 
  RunsWhilePaused: false :end 
  ConditionList: MinCash0 :end 
  TriggerText: Tom's Tools ran out of money and was forced to 
close. You're out of a job. :end 
 :end //of Trigger 
 
 Trigger: 
  TriggerName: TomLowPassHack :end 
  TriggerClass: CashTrigger :end 
  FrequencyInDays: .25 :end 
  FixedDelay: 0 :end 
  RandomDelay: .25 :end 
  RunsWhilePaused: false :end 
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  ConditionList: time1hour AND TomShortPass AND 
(TomNeverChgPass OR TomAnyCharPass) AND_NOT Phase1Done :end 
  TriggerText: Tom's password settings are too low; an 
Internet hacker was able to break into his computer and read the 
Inventory. Cost $10000. :end 
  Parameter: -10000 :end 
 :end //of Trigger 
 
 Trigger: 
  TriggerName: TomHiighPassForget :end 
  TriggerClass: CashTrigger :end 
  FrequencyInDays: .25 :end 
  FixedDelay: 0 :end 
  RandomDelay: .25 :end 
  RunsWhilePaused: false :end 
  ConditionList: time1hour AND TomLongPass AND 
TomCompexCharPass AND Tom2MChgPass AND_NOT TomWritePass AND_NOT 
TomTrain75 :end 
  TriggerText: Tom's password settings are too high, he 
forgot it and you had to reset it for him. Cost: $50. :end 
  Parameter: -50 :end 
 :end //of Trigger 
 
 Trigger: 
  TriggerName: JaneHighPassForget :end 
  TriggerClass: CashTrigger :end 
  FrequencyInDays: .25 :end 
  FixedDelay: 0 :end 
  RandomDelay: .25 :end 
  RunsWhilePaused: false :end 
  ConditionList: time1hour AND JaneLongPass AND 
JaneComplexCharPass AND Jane2MChgPass AND_NOT JaneWritePass AND_NOT 
JaneTrain75 :end 
  TriggerText: Jane's password settings are too high, she 
forgot it and you had to reset it for her. Cost: $50. :end 
  Parameter: -50 :end 
 :end //of Trigger 
 
 Trigger: 
  TriggerName: JaneHighPassWritten :end 
  TriggerClass: CashTrigger :end 
  FrequencyInDays: .25 :end 
  FixedDelay: 0 :end 
  RandomDelay: .25 :end 
  RunsWhilePaused: false :end 
  ConditionList: time1hour AND JaneLongPass AND 
JaneComplexCharPass AND Jane2MChgPass AND JaneWritePass AND_NOT 
JaneTrain75 AND_NOT Phase1Done :end 
  TriggerText: Jane's password settings are too high, she had 
it written down and a customer saw it. Cost: $1000 :end 
  Parameter: -1000 :end 
 :end //of Trigger 
 
 Trigger: 
  TriggerName: ReadAttack :end 
  TriggerClass: CashTrigger :end 
  FrequencyInDays: .25 :end 
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  FixedDelay: 0 :end 
  RandomDelay: .25 :end 
  RunsWhilePaused: false :end 
  ConditionList: Phase1Done AND time1hour AND_NOT 
((JaneLongPass AND JaneComplexCharPass AND Jane2MChgPass) OR 
JaneWritePass) :end 
  TriggerText: Jane's computer was broken into and someone 
from Hammer House was able to read the Inventory. Cost $30,000. :end 
  Parameter: -30000 :end 
 :end //of Trigger 
 
 Trigger: 
  TriggerName: InvWriteAttack :end 
  TriggerClass: LoseTrigger :end 
  FrequencyInDays: .5 :end 
  FixedDelay: 0 :end 
  RandomDelay: .25 :end 
  RunsWhilePaused: false :end 
  ConditionList: Phase1Done AND time1hour AND_NOT 
(TomLongPass AND TomCompexCharPass AND Tom2MChgPass) :end 
  TriggerText: Tom's computer was broken into and someone 
from Hammer House was able to change the store Inventory. Because of 
this attack, Tom's Tools is forced to close and you're out of a job. 
:end 
 :end //of Trigger 
 
 Trigger: 
  TriggerName: Win :end 
  TriggerClass: WinTrigger :end 
  FrequencyInDays: 999 :end 
  FixedDelay: .25 :end 
  RandomDelay: 0 :end 
  RunsWhilePaused: false :end 
  ConditionList: HighPWAccept AND HighPWSet :end 
  TriggerText: With password settings at their highest, you 
were able to thwart Hammer House's attack attempts long enough to 
gather enough evidence to get a court injunction against Hammer House 
and their hackers. Things are returning to normal at Tom's Tools, and 
business is increasing as the media attention drives business away from 
Hammer House. :end 
 :end //of Trigger 
 
 Trigger: 
  TriggerName: SellNails :end 
  TriggerClass: TickerTrigger :end 
  FrequencyInDays: .25 :end 
  FixedDelay: 0 :end 
  RandomDelay: .05 :end 
  RunsWhilePaused: false :end 
  ConditionList: NOT Phase2Done :end 
  TriggerText: Jane sells a box of nails. :end 
 :end //of Trigger 
 
 Trigger: 
  TriggerName: SellPlywood :end 
  TriggerClass: TickerTrigger :end 
  FrequencyInDays: .25 :end 
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  FixedDelay: 0 :end 
  RandomDelay: .1 :end 
  RunsWhilePaused: false :end 
  ConditionList: NOT Phase2Done :end 
  TriggerText: Tom sells several sheets of plywood. :end 
 :end //of Trigger 
 
 Trigger: 
  TriggerName: SellScrewdriver :end 
  TriggerClass: TickerTrigger :end 
  FrequencyInDays: .25 :end 
  FixedDelay: 0 :end 
  RandomDelay: .06 :end 
  RunsWhilePaused: false :end 
  ConditionList: NOT Phase2Done :end 
  TriggerText: Jane sells a screwdriver and a case of screws. 
:end 
 :end //of Trigger 
 
 Trigger: 
  TriggerName: SellSaw :end 
  TriggerClass: TickerTrigger :end 
  FrequencyInDays: .25 :end 
  FixedDelay: 0 :end 
  RandomDelay: .09 :end 
  RunsWhilePaused: false :end 
  ConditionList: NOT Phase2Done :end 
  TriggerText: Jane sells a power saw. :end 
 :end //of Trigger 
 
 Trigger: 
  TriggerName: JobApp :end 
  TriggerClass: TickerTrigger :end 
  FrequencyInDays: .5 :end 
  FixedDelay: 0 :end 
  RandomDelay: .1 :end 
  RunsWhilePaused: false :end 
  ConditionList: NOT Phase2Done :end 
  TriggerText: Tom receives a job application in his e-mail. 
:end 
 :end //of Trigger 
 
 Trigger: 
  TriggerName: SellLightBulbs :end 
  TriggerClass: TickerTrigger :end 
  FrequencyInDays: .25 :end 
  FixedDelay: 0 :end 
  RandomDelay: .11 :end 
  RunsWhilePaused: false :end 
  ConditionList: NOT Phase2Done :end 
  TriggerText: Jane sells a bundle of light bulbs. :end 
 :end //of Trigger 
 
 Trigger: 
  TriggerName: SellCordlessDrill :end 
  TriggerClass: TickerTrigger :end 
  FrequencyInDays: .25 :end 
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  FixedDelay: 0 :end 
  RandomDelay: .08 :end 
  RunsWhilePaused: false :end 
  ConditionList: NOT Phase2Done :end 
  TriggerText: Tom sells a cordless drill. :end 





 TagName: First :end 
 DisplayName: Configure password settings. :end 
 CompletedText: Password settings look good, neither too loose nor 
too strict. :end 
 UncompletedText: ... :end 
 PhaseCompleted: false :end 
 :end //of Phase 
 
Phase: 
 TagName: Second :end 
 DisplayName: Lock down component password settings. :end 
 CompletedText: Password settings are now at their highest and the 
users accept this. :end 
 UncompletedText: ... :end 
 PhaseCompleted: false :end 





 TagName: MedPWSettings :end 
 DisplayName: Configure password settings. :end 
 Phase: 0 :end 
 CompletedText: Password settings look good. :end 
 UncompletedText: Password settings still need work. :end 
:end //of Objective 
 
Objective: 
 TagName: HighPWSettings :end 
 DisplayName: Lock down component password settings. :end 
 Phase: 1 :end 
 CompletedText: Password settings look good. :end 
 UncompletedText: Password settings still need work. :end 
:end //of Objective 
 
Objective: 
 TagName: HighPWUsersAccept :end 
 DisplayName: Users accept the password settings. :end 
 Phase: 1 :end 
 CompletedText: Users accept the password settings. :end 
 UncompletedText: Users dislike the password settings. :end 




 Tom's Tools is a new tool selling business. Computer break-in 
attempts have caused them to hire you to replace their previous 
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computer consultant, who didn't have a security background. You need to 
configure the password settings on Tom and Jane's computers so that 
they can work without password policy issues coming up. (PARAGRAPH) See 




 You need to manage the password settings on Tom and Jane's 
computers. They need to be able to work for a while without password 
policy issues coming up in order to advance to the next phase. 
(PARAGRAPH) Since this is a small business, the users need remote 
access so they can access the system when they are not in the store. 
Workstations also need Internet access so they can access e-mail to 
answer customer and vendor inquiries; the e-mail server is located off 
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APPENDIX B. PLAYER EVALUATIONS 
The following pages reproduce the evaluations completed by students who played 
the scenario.  Player responses are italicized. 
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CyberCIEGE – Tom’s Tools scenario player evaluation 
 
Thank you for taking the time to evaluate the Tom’s Tools scenario for CyberCIEGE. 
 
In order to play the game, you will need to mount the Windows share containing 
CyberCIEGE: 
 
Open My Computer, and in the box next to Address, enter 
\\kiska\Groups2$\CyberCIEGE 
 
Open “Password Policies.bat” and follow the directions.  
 
Please be aware that when you play the game, some of the results from playing will be 
saved to a log file for later evaluation. 
 
What do you think the game was attempting to teach? 
 
The game was attempting to teach good password composition techniques and that 
passwords are susceptible to attacks, such as brute force.   
 
 
If you were already aware of these issues, do you think that someone who is not might 
learn something from it? 
 
I think this scenario is definitely good for teaching someone about password security.   
 
 
As a game, did you enjoy playing it?  If not, what would improve your enjoyment of it? 
 
I enjoyed playing it…maybe making the text in the objectives tab more descriptive would 
be helpful.  Overall though good job ☺ 
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CyberCIEGE – Tom’s Tools scenario player evaluation 
 
Thank you for taking the time to evaluate the Tom’s Tools scenario for CyberCIEGE. 
 
In order to play the game, you will need to mount the Windows share containing 
CyberCIEGE: 
 
Open My Computer, and in the box next to Address, enter 
\\kiska\Groups2$\CyberCIEGE 
 
Open “Password Policies.bat” and follow the directions.  
 
Please be aware that when you play the game, some of the results from playing will be 
saved to a log file for later evaluation. 
 
What do you think the game was attempting to teach? 
 
Phase1: Configure Password 
It would be nice to describe what sort of password policy that the company is adopting. 
 
It would be nice to have a short description or guide the user to understand the Short, 
Medium, Long password length mean. This would apply to Password Character Set, 
Change Password Every. This will be useful for beginner.  
 
There is no indication that the user has successfully completed the objective 1. 
There is some error on the Zone Tab. If click on it, the whole game is terminated. 
Encounter a couple of crashes (Not too such what happen, maybe it is the server) 
 
If I only set the password configuration on “Janes” computer only, the game allow me to 
proceed to the next Phase. Is that right? I presume that the policy should apply 
throughout the Company. 
 
Phase 2: Lock down component password settings. 
I am not sure what does this objective meant. I did not finish the game as I am stuck here. 
 
 
If you were already aware of these issues, do you think that someone who is not might 
learn something from it? 
 
This can be used to re-enforce the ideas because a professional IT may sometime 
overlook the fundamental stuff. 
 
 
As a game, did you enjoy playing it?  If not, what would improve your enjoyment of it? 
 
I think it would be nice to have more guidance. 
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CyberCIEGE – Tom’s Tools scenario player evaluation 
 
Thank you for taking the time to evaluate the Tom’s Tools scenario for CyberCIEGE. 
 
In order to play the game, you will need to mount the Windows share containing 
CyberCIEGE: 
 
Open My Computer, and in the box next to Address, enter 
\\kiska\Groups2$\CyberCIEGE 
 
Open “Password Policies.bat” and follow the directions.  
 
Please be aware that when you play the game, some of the results from playing will be 
saved to a log file for later evaluation. 
 
What do you think the game was attempting to teach? 
 
Phase 1: The need for password control. 
a) Set the password length (must be medium, too high, play forget) 
b) Set the password complexity (medium) 
c) Set the frequency of change (2 months) 
 
Phase 2: Lock Down Component Password Setting. 




If you were already aware of these issues, do you think that someone who is not might 
learn something from it? 
 
 
As a game, did you enjoy playing it?  If not, what would improve your enjoyment of it? 
 
Ø Note that the Zone tab crashes the application.  
Ø Actually, the objectives are met for phase 1 if I configure only Jane's computer. 
However it does not work it I configure Tom's only. Think need to check both Tom's and 
Jane's computers to achieve objectives. 
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CyberCIEGE – Tom’s Tools scenario player evaluation 
 
Thank you for taking the time to evaluate the Tom’s Tools scenario for CyberCIEGE. 
 
In order to play the game, you will need to mount the Windows share containing 
CyberCIEGE: 
 
Open My Computer, and in the box next to Address, enter 
\\kiska\Groups2$\CyberCIEGE 
 
Open “Password Policies.bat” and follow the directions.  
 
Please be aware that when you play the game, some of the results from playing will be 
saved to a log file for later evaluation. 
 
What do you think the game was attempting to teach? 
 
That if you make your password policy too complex, that you will undermine the goals of 
the security program.  If you make it too weak, then you are vulnerable to attack. 
 
 
If you were already aware of these issues, do you think that someone who is not might 
learn something from it? 
 
Maybe, maybe not…I think there needs to be more instruction in the game…Are you 
going to include any feedback mechanisms in the scenario? 
 
 
As a game, did you enjoy playing it?  If not, what would improve your enjoyment of it? 
 
No, I felt lost.  I had no idea that it was phase two and there were new objectives.   
 
More directions on the first objective on what is expected. 
What is the 2nd objective trying to communicate? 
 
Why can’t I enforce password policy on the web server? 
 
I need more feedback…of course, too much limits the gameplaying enjoyment…hmmm 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
93 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
[Adams 1999] Adams, A. and Sasse, M. A. (1999, December). “Users Are Not The 
Enemy.” Communications of the ACM, vol. 42, no. 12, pp. 40-46.  
[Altova 2005] XMLSpy 2005. Altova, release 3. Retrieved July 2005 from the World 
Wide Web: http://www.altova.com/products_ide.html 
[Bickel 2003] Bickel, R., Cook, M., Haney, J., Kerr, M. Parker, T., and Pares, H. (2003, 
December). Guide to Securing Microsoft Windows XP. National Security Agency, 
Operational Network Evaluations Division of the Systems and Network Attack 
Center. Retrieved September 2005 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.nsa.gov/snac/os/winxp/winxp.pdf
[Bishop 1991] Bishop, M. (1991, February).  “Password Management.”  Compcon Spring 
1991 Digest of Papers, San Francisco, California, pp. 167-169. 
[Bishop 1995] Bishop, M. and Klein, D. V. (1995). “Improving System Security via 
Proactive Password Checking.” Computers & Security, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 233-
249. 
[Bown 2004] Bown, M. (2004, September). Password Management. Safecoms. Retrieved 
August 2005 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.safecoms.com.au/resources/newsletters/september2004/password/
[CISR 2005] Naval Postgraduate School Center for Information Systems Security Studies 
and Research. (2005). CyberCIEGE Scenario Development Tool User’s Guide. 
[ComponentSoftware 2005] CSDiff.  ComponentSoftware, version 5.0.  Retrieved 
September 2005 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.componentsoftware.com/Products/CSDiff/
[Davis 1989] Davis, F. D. (1989, September). “Perceived Usefulness, Perceived Ease of 
Use, and User Acceptance of Information Technology.” MIS Quarterly, vol. 13, 
no. 3, pp. 319-340. 
94 
[Dierks 1999] Dierks, T. and Allen, C. (1999, January). RFC 2246: The TLS Protocol, 
Version 1.0. Internet Engineering Task Force, Network Working Group. 
Retrieved September 2005 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt 
[Feldmeier 1990] Feldmeier, D. C. and Karn, P. R. (1990, January). “UNIX Password 
Security – Ten Years Later.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 435, pp. 
44-63. 
[Ferguson 1998] Ferguson, P. and Huston, G. (1998, April). “What is a VPN?” 
OPENSIG’98 Workshop on Open Signaling for ATM, Internet, and Mobile 
Networks, Toronto, Canada. 
[Ferré 2001] Ferré, X., Juristo, N., Windul, H., and Constantine, L. (2001, 
January/February). “Usability Basics for Software Developers.”  IEEE Software, 
vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 22-29. 
[Ganesan 1994] Ganesan, R. and Davies, C. (1994, October).  “A New Attack on 
Random Pronounceable Password Generators.” 17th National Computer Security 
Conference, Baltimore, Maryland. 
[Garris 2002] Garris, R., Ahlers, R., and Driskell, J. E. (2002, December). “Games, 
Motivation, and Learning: A Research and Practice Model.” Simulation & 
Gaming, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 441-467. 
[Irvine 2004] Irvine, C. E. and Thompson, M. F. (2004, July). “Expressing an 
Information Security Policy Within a Security Simulation Game.” Proceedings of 
the Sixth Workshop on Education in Computer Security, Monterey, California, pp. 
43-49. 
[Irvine 2005] Irvine, C. E., Thompson, M. F., and Allen, K. (2005, May/June). 
“CyberCIEGE: Gaming for Information Assurance.” IEEE Security & Privacy 
Magazine, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 61-64. 
[Johns 2004] Johns, K. W. (2004). Toward Managing & Automating CyberCIEGE 
Scenario Definition File Creation. Master of Science Thesis, Department of 
Computer Science, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.  
95 
[Kurzban 1985] Kurzban, S. A.  (1985). “Easily Remembered Passphrases—A Better 
Approach.” ACM SIGSAC Review, vol. 3, no. 2-4, pp. 10-21. 
[LaMore 2004] LaMore, R. L. (2004). CyberCEIGE Scenario Illustrating Secrecy Issues 
Through Mandatory and Discretionary Access Control Policies in a Multi-Level 
Security Network. Master of Science Thesis, Department of Computer Science, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 
[Levine 2004] Levine, J. G., Grizzard, J. B., and Owen, H. L. (2004, 
November/December). “Using Honeynets to Protect Large Enterprise Networks.” 
IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine, vol. 2, no. 6, pp. 73-75. 
[Loshin 2001] Loshin, P. (2001, June). “Sealing the Pipes.” Information Security. 
Retrieved September 2005 from the World Wide Web: 
http://infosecuritymag.techtarget.com/articles/june01/features_protocols.shtml
[Microsoft 2004] Hypertext (2004). The Microsoft Windows User Experience.  Microsoft 
Corporation. Retrieved August 2005 from the World Wide Web: 
http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/en-us/dnwue/html/welcome.asp 
[Neff 2003] Neff, G. and Stark, D. (2003). “Permanently Beta: Responsive Organization 
in the Internet Era” in Society Online: The Internet in Context, Howard, P. N. and 
Jones, S., eds., pp. 173-188. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Retrieved August 2005 
from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.sociology.columbia.edu/people/faculty/stark/papers/permanently_beta
.pdf 
[NIST 1985] Hypertext (1985). Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 
112 – Password Usage. United States Department of Commerce, National 
Institute of Standards and Technology. Retrieved August 2005 from the World 
Wide Web: http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip112.htm 
[NIST 1995] Hypertext (1995, October). NIST Special Publication 800-12 – An 
Introduction to Computer Security: The NIST Handbook. United States 
Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology. 
96 
Retrieved August 2005 from the World Wide Web: 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-12/800-12-html/index.html 
[O’Gorman 2003] O’Gorman, L. (2003, December). “Comparing Passwords, Tokens, 
and Biometrics for User Authentication.” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 91, no. 
12, pp. 2019-2040. 
 [Prensky 2001] Prensky, M. (2001). “Simulations: Are They Games?” in Digital Game-
Based Learning. New York: McGraw-Hill. Retrieved August 2005 from the 
World Wide Web: http://www.marcprensky.com/writing/Prensky%20-
%20Simulations-Are%20They%20Games.pdf
[Rivermind 2004] Rivermind, Inc. (2004). Scenario Format Template, version 15m. 
[Saltzer 1975] Saltzer, J. H. and Schroeder, M. D. (1975, September). “The Protection of 
Information in Computer Systems.” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 63, no. 9, pp. 
1278-1308. 
[Shinder 2003] Shinder, D. (2003). Passwords: The Weak Link in Network Security. 
WindowSecurity.com. Retrieved August 2005 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.windowsecurity.com/articles/Passwords_Network_Security.html
[Sonnenberg 2003] Sonnenberg, A. (2003, June). SSO: Enabling an Effective Password 
Policy. Imprivata, Inc. Retrieved August 2005 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.infosec.co.uk/files/White_Paper_2003_imprivata_password_policy.pd
f 
[Thompson 2005] Thompson, M. F. (2005, August). “RE: Chapter 2, 8/24.”  Personal e-
mail. 
[Warren 2003] Warren, D. (2003). Course Notes for CS3600: Introduction to Information 
Assurance (IA): Computer Security. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California. 
[Yan 2001] Yan, J. J. (2001, September). “A Note on Proactive Password Checking.” 
Proceedings of the 2001 Workshop on New Security Paradigms, Cloudcroft, New 
Mexico, pp. 127-135. 
 
97 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Ken Allen 
Rivermind, Inc 
Mountain View, CA 
 
4. Hugo A. Badillo 
NSA 
Fort Meade, MD 
 




6. RADM Joseph Burns 
Fort George Meade, MD  
 
7. John Campbell 
National Security Agency 
Fort Meade, MD 
 
8. Deborah Cooper 
DC Associates, LLC 
Roslyn, VA  
 
9. CDR Daniel L. Currie 
PMW 161 
San Diego, CA  
 
10. Louise Davidson 
National Geospatial Agency 
Bethesda, MD  
 
11. Vincent J. DiMaria 
National Security Agency 
Fort Meade, MD 
 
98 
12. LCDR James Downey 
NAVSEA 
Washington, DC  
 
13. Scott Gallardo 
Rivermind, Inc 
Mountain View, CA 
 
14. Dr. Diana Gant 
National Science Foundation 
 




16. Richard Hale 
DISA 
Falls Church, VA 
 
17. LCDR Scott  D. Heller 
SPAWAR 
San Diego, CA 
 












21. Dr. Carl Landwehr 
 National Science Foundation 
Arlington, VA 
 
22. Steve LaFountain 
 NSA 
Fort Meade, MD 
 





24. Penny Lehtola 
NSA 
Fort Meade, MD  
 
25. Gilman Louie 
In-Q-Tel 
Menlo Park, CA  
 
26. Ernest Lucier 
Federal Aviation Administration 
Washington, DC 
 
27. CAPT Deborah McGhee 
Headquarters U.S. Navy 
Arlington, VA 
 
28. Dr. Vic Maconachy 
NSA 
Fort Meade, MD 
 
29. Doug Maughan 
Department of Homeland Security 
Washington, DC 
 








32. Jim Roberts 
Central Intelligence Agency 
Reston, VA 
 
33. Charles Sherupski 
Sherassoc 
Round Hill, VA 
 
100 








36. David Wirth 
N641 
Arlington, VA  
 
37. Daniel Wolf 
 NSA 
Fort Meade, MD 
 




39. CAPT Robert Zellmann 
CNO Staff N614 
Arlington, VA 
 
40. Dr. Cynthia E. Irvine 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
41. Paul C. Clark 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
42. Michael Thompson 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
43. David S. Mueller 
Civilian, Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
